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Moldova as a Neighbor of an Expanding EU: Economic Challenges 
 
by Anatol Gudim, presented at the International Conference "European Perspectives for the 




It seems that the protracted stay of Moldova within a so-called “grey zone”, area of geopolitical 
uncertainty, comes to the end. Now, after Brussels has launched the “Wider Europe” concept, the 
Government declared the idea of Europeanization to be an official priority and recent polls 
ascertained that 70% of the Moldovans favored EU integration. Since Moldova is not a real 
candidate for the EU membership in the mid-term perspective, there is enough time for 
adaptation of its economy to the European criteria as an “EU neighbor”. Basically, Moldova 
should accelerate reforms regardless of the fact whether Moldova will be an EU member or not. 
This requires normalizing relations between the state and the economy, maintaining 
macroeconomic stability, improving business competitiveness, activating employment and 
human resources development. 
 
European choice is a strong incentive for Moldova, since it is this choice that provides the 
country with both democracy and institution-building, internal stability and external security. 
Moldova today is a partitioned state located at the periphery of the uniting Europe. When the EU 
expands to the east after 2007, the Republic of Moldova, including Transnistria, will border upon 
the region that professes principles of stability and security, prevention and elimination of 
conflict situations. Reunion of the country will open new possibilities before Moldova: 
strengthening its statehood based on international norms and rules; ensuring economic growth in 
view of improving the country’s image and activating foreign trade, investments inflow and 
restructuring of the external debt; enhancement of the population’s living conditions and poverty 
reduction.  
 
The future position of the Republic of Moldova as an EU neighbor will depend mostly on the 
economic policy pursued today. On the whole, the nature and direction of reforms initiated in 
90’s – given all their inconsistency and contradictoriness – transformed a centrally planned 
economy into a market one.  
 
At one time Moldova even enjoyed a reputation as one of the leading reformers in the region. By 
the mid-90’s Moldova’s policy-makers had successfully tackled a number of first-generation 
reforms, such as freeing up the vast majority of prices and liberalising domestic trade. Similarly, 
responsible monetary policies had brought a relatively quick end to the hyperinflation 
experienced in the early 90’s, while liberalised trade policies permitted Moldova to become one 
of the first CIS countries to join the WTO. In terms of privatisation, a mass voucher scheme 
relatively quickly sold off the state-run small and medium enterprise sector. As a result, 
Moldova’s private sector now accounts for 90% of officical GDP, dominating not only the 
nascent services sector but also agriculture, following the break-up of collective farms in the late 
90’s, and industry, following the post-privatisation restructuring of two-thirds of the country’s 
manufacturing enterprises.  
 
Over a short period of time economy of the Republic of Moldova firstly went through a sharp 
downfall (by 2/3 as regards GDP), later endured a stable depression (aggravated by 
consequences of the Russian financial crisis of 1998) and, finally, during the last four years, 
experienced renewal of economic growth, increasing internal consumption and incomes of the 
population.  
 
Moldova’s economy and its trade, earlier fully oriented to the East, have started to turn gradually 
to Europe. Thus, in 2003 more than 1/3 of Moldova’s export fell on EU and CEE countries. To a 
certain degree, this was facilitated by realization of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
between the EU and Moldova (since 1998). Priorities realized now by both parties are as follows: 
negotiations on a Free Trade Area, investment promotion, customs and cross-border cooperation, 
justice, home affairs and legal approximation.  
 
The problem is that over the last years Moldova stayed within a so called “grey zone” – zone of 
geopolitical uncertainty. But even in this situation the country has already received about 300 mil 
euro of aid from the EU within the framework of the European Commission, TACIS and other 
programs. These funds were meant for macroeconomic support, stimulation of private sector and 
export, as well as for reformation of administrative and judiciary systems.  
 
At the present, though, Moldova’s leadership puts the question more actively – it declares that 
European integration is an external policy priority of the country. The Government has finally 
prepared the Concept for European Integration, which emphasizes that “on the internal level the 
actions of the Republic of Moldova will be mostly oriented towards meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria”. And further on: “a progressive economic development of the Republic of Moldova 
represents the basis for the improvement of economic environment and consolidation of the 
relations with the EU. Promotion of structural economic reforms is a way to modernize the 
Republic of Moldova, to lessen and gradually eliminate gaps between developed European states 
and to create a functional and transparent market economy compatible with the EU principles, 
norms, mechanisms, institutions and policies”.  
 
These are our intentions. The reality is much more contradictory. And results of 2003 show it. 
The Government thinks “2003 will go down in history as a year of new achievements in socio-
economic development of the Republic of Moldova” (Prime-Minister V. Tarlev in the 
Parliament, 26.12.2003). But Fitch Ratings evaluated, nonetheless, 2003 as “another 
disappointing year for Moldova… the government has failed to accelerate structural reforms” 
(5.12.2003).  
 
The truth apparently is somewhere in between. One could assess work of the Government, 
Ministry of Finance and National Bank as successful based on the fact that they managed to 
maintain macroeconomic stability, there were positive changes in industry, constructions and 
services, incomes of the population increased, but the Government’s activity along the 
reformation path has been mostly based on the “one step forward – two steps back” principle, 
which was the cause IMF and World Bank were so evidently disappointed saying that Moldova’s 
liberal-market economic course is being transformed into state dirigisme.  
 
Any government has to produce optimism. And ours does, as well. Results of the year, according 
to official estimates, are very optimistic: GDP grew by 6.8%, industry – 17.0%, domestic 
investments – 23.0%, export – 25.1%. State budget incomes increased by 36.2% and incomes of 
the population – 19%, including average monthly wage in the national economy – by 31% and 
pensions – by 28%. Social sphere received 53.7% of the total expenditures of the consolidated 
budget.  
 
These indicators are used by the Government to confirm that its actions to revive the economy 
are correct. It would be proper, though, at the same time to mention the risk factors as well that 
in 2003 intensified, rather than subside. Among them are:  
 
• Quality, structure of the GDP growth. Share of real sector is rather small within the 2003 
GDP growth. Its largest part is being formed in services and by net taxes on goods and 
import. GDP growth given such its structure is not equivalent increase of real resources at 
all;  
• Unsatisfactory state of business environment, which shows through insufficient volume 
and structure of export (it is still less than the 1997 level), uncertainty of foreign 
investors’ disposition, freezing of privatization and preservation of a vast shadow 
economy sector;  
• Critical state of the country’s balance of payment due to almost double exceeding of 
import over export, while after relations with IMF and World Bank had cooled off 
possibilities of receipt of currency through external loans and investments have sharply 
dropped. Of a little help is replenishment of the country with money transfers of our 
citizens working abroad – circa 500 mil USD in 2003;  
• Inflation leap up to 15.7% in 2003 (4.4% in 2002) and 20.0% increase in prices for 
foodstuff. Approximate 1/3 increase of wages and pensions also left its traces, even 
though wage arrears reached 13,3 mil USD. Danger emerges of a critical gap between the 
need to expand monetary aggregates and capacities of the inflation-free emission;  
• Further increase of external (1,4 bil USD) and internal (2,9 bil MDL) state debt;  
• Unreformed state machinery, which is the cause many “2003 initiatives” either were not 
realized, or yielded small or negative results. Among them are: implementation of the 
strategy of economic growth and poverty reduction, development of a competitive 
environment and small and medium business support, activization of export and foreign 
investments attraction, administrative-territorial reform, fight against economic crimes 
and corruption, rapprochement with Transnistria.  
 
Unfortunately, 2004 is another pre-election year and, of course, there will be a lot of PR-
economy, Government’s promises and counter-critics of the opposition. Nonetheless, one could 
insist that the country’s economy had already adapted to market conditions and therefore growth 
inertia has already emerged, and given all risk factors no one should expect any force majeure 
events during 2004. There are encouraging signs that, economic policy will finally become 
intelligent and we will get a “year of active actions”.  
Reasoning from that, the Government and the business community must concentrate on 
improving the functioning of the economy: 
 
• Normalizing relations between the state and economy, improving the business 
environment, developing the legal and institutional market infrastructure and eliminating 
the non-market mechanisms of market regulation;  
• Converging the existing and future Moldovan economic legislation with the EU’s 
legislation (acquis communataire); the objective is to create a coherent set of rules 
facilitating the development of trade between Moldova and the EU. From the point of 
view of the economy, the most important are the norms regulating the financial situation 
and functioning of economic entities, and the norms regulating economic relations;  
• Maintaining macroeconomic stability, lowering the inflation rate, creating incentives to 
save and invest, ensuring stability of public finances through limiting the scale of deficits 
and the public sectors debt and carrying out of reforms of the social security system and 
the financing of the health care system, while of the same time striving towards limiting 
taxation and the role of the state in the redistribution of incomes;  
• Implementing restructuring programmes, allocating resources to the most efficient 
sectors of the industry, increasing productivity and the competitiveness of products which 
will take into consideration the timetable for liberalization of the trade between Moldova 
and the EU. Industrial policy of the Government must be based on the assumption that 
the key to success of Moldovan enterprises in the Union market will be the role of 
management and their market strategies, as well as the ability to achieve fast increases of 
productivity through investing in both human and material resources;  
• Structural transformation of agriculture and rural development will be related to the 
implementation of two parallel processes: modernization of agriculture aimed at 
improving the agricultural and socio-professional structure and increasing the 
competitiveness of Moldova’s agriculture; and diversified development of rural areas 
allowing permanent or temporary outflow of agricultural workers to non-agricultural jobs 
and support for alternative sources of income accompanied by development of the 
technical and social infrastructure of rural areas;  
• Intensifying state and private sector participation in the development of the infrastructure 
(electric power sector, gas system, telecommunications, transport, water supply) through 
their financing from budget resources and creating incentives for participation of foreign 
investors;  
• Improving the allocative role of the labor market, supporting the development of human 
resources and in particular providing the necessary funds for the development of science 
and improvements in the quality of education;  
• Consumer protection: adaptation of Moldova’s legislation and business practice to the 
requirements of the EU, creating a product safety monitoring system;  
• Ensuring a well-balanced socio-economic development of the country’s regions based on 
stimulation of development of towns – growth poles, efficient utilization of local labor, 
financial and natural resources, capacities formed by the “Upper Prut” and “Lower 
Danube” Euro-regions, cross-border cooperation, as well as investment projects 
implemented within the framework of the Pact for Stability in the South-Eastern Europe;  
• Thorough information of the society on the neighborhood process being carried out by 
the Government’s promotion activities and non-governmental institutions. The overall 
positive attitude of Moldovans towards the EU, nonetheless, contains many myths, 
anxieties and hopes. Therefore, a vigorous information campaign aimed at presenting all 
the benefits and costs of the neighborhood with the EU to prepare the country’s 
population for the life when Moldova’s geo-political situation after 2007 will be 
dramatically changing.  
 
The Government is convinced that there are no fundamental contradictions between the pro-CIS 
and pro-EU policies. The European Commission’s opinion is apparently different declaring that 
in the mid-term perspective Moldova has no chances of becoming an EU member. The EU 
Board started to work out an action plan for Moldova. And further everything will depend on 
political will and consistency of actions of the Moldovan party.  
 
Proposing ever new initiatives along the European direction (as also regards settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict) we should not slacken efforts to realize political and economic clauses of 
the EU-Moldova PCA. The PCA potential is far from being fully realized. What can PCA give to 
Moldova as regards approaching Europe? This includes: 
 
• creation of joint bodies (including the higher level) to examine all problems related to 
partnership and cooperation between the RM and EU;  
• formation of the “functioning” legal environment through approximation of Moldovan 
legislation to the EU one;  
• accustoming to universally recognized rules of international trade;  
• gradual transition to normal conditions of competition, which in the end should raise the 
economy’s efficiency;  
• financial assistance of the EU in developing key sectors of our country, which helps 
implement economic and social reforms.  
 
Now, the most realistic for Moldova is its participation in processes of sectoral integration with 
the EU. This means ensuring Moldova with autonomous trade preferences followed by the Free 
Trade Agreement, infrastructure development, border control, etc. One of the priority directions 
of the PCA implementation is creation of a free trade zone between Moldova and EU. It is 
important to mention that since the present Moldova still cannot assume obligations to create a 
zone of free trade with the EU (due to underdeveloped competitive environment and 
administrative capacities), the EU is willing to consider new possibilities of providing Moldovan 
goods access to the market within the framework stipulated by the WTO.  
 
Speaking of Moldova’s European vector, one should consider both “pros” and “cons” of such 
orientation. Indeed, it could be already a near future when Moldova as a new neighbor of the EU 
will be able to count on raising financial and technical assistance, facilitation of visa regime, 
access to new markets. At the same time, given the Moldova’s unavailability, some of these 
advantages may turn into problems.  
 
Thus, for instance, transition of the united Europe to common norms and standards will 
undoubtedly facilitate movement of goods throughout its market. With this in mind, Moldova 
should provide “euro-harmonization” of its standards and requirements and the conformity 
assessment procedures. Sluggishness will sharply worsen the access of Moldovan products to 
European markets, especially as regards foodstuffs.  
 
Another important aspect is attracting foreign investments into the country. And this requires 
urgent improvement of the country’s investment climate; otherwise after the EU enlargement it 
will be our neighbors – the new EU members – who will become main recipients of European 
subsidies and technical assistance programs. It is not excluded it will be the new members’ 
economies that EU will encourage investments into, leaving the “tardy” Moldova outside this 
activity.  
 
Process of Moldova’s approaching Europe requires a lot of efforts and time. Therefore it is not 
rare when a question arises: is EU membership an absolute necessity for Moldova? To answer 
this question, a more detailed analysis of the impact of EU policies (Common Agricultural 
Policy, Social and Labor Market policies, Standard and Costs in Environmental Protection, etc.) 
on our national interests is necessary.  
 
According to the President V. Voronin “enthusiasm of all branches of power is now focused at 
the European integration”. But this enthusiasm also requires a wider public support. It is still 
unstable. According to opinion polls, population favors EU and CIS almost equally. Taking this 
into account, the two-level EU policy concerning Moldova is important – at the level of the 
Government and the civil society. This will be the case when in our country notion of 
“integration” will link closer to such notions as “democracy” and “development”.  
 
Ultimately, all of us need democratically stable Moldova, integral from the political, social and 
territorial points of view. And its approach to Europe will undoubtedly enhance external positive 





A Look from the Outside: Structural Impediments to Growth Run Risks of Strangulating 
Moldova's Recovery 
 
by Karsten N. Pedersen, The Netherlands 
 
 
While reading CISR’s recent new discussion papers on economic developments in Moldova 
some thought came to mind - perhaps useful for your thinking, perhaps just bits for the web to 
digest.  
 
Year 2003 well-extended an economic performance of high income and spending growth that 
during past three years provided for remarkable improvements to Moldavian livings standards.  
 
In an increasing liberal economic environment, households' purchasing power rose again last 
year as not only income transfers from migrant labor abroad continued to increase but also in 
response to the further opening of the country's external trading regime.  
 
To date, economic reforms have proven largely inexpensive to government budget that continues 
strive for the soon return to social safety nets well-known from the past - but still unaffordable as 
public funding arrives principally from low taxation of incomes, external tariffs and modest 
exercise duties on increasing consumer spending high income sensitive consumer articles. Since 
late 1990s, budget expenditure extended consistently with revenue receipts offering the financial 
room to early repayment of outstanding debts - while recurrent expenditure sustaining minimal 
public service helped maintain the country's productive work force.  
 
On this background, the arrival of growth in 2003 with declining formal sector employment and 
fiscal budget imbalance symptomize structural deficiencies that pose an increasingly toll in 
economy recovery by putting into place the question of likely benefits from recent economic 
reform initiatives.  
 
Moldova endures – with her growing share of labor force locating abroad – a migrant society 
where small change to earning and employment opportunity tends to generate large flows of job 
seekers between the domestic economy and foreign countries. The government – in collaboration 
with the international financial institutions – recently embarked on a large scale poverty 
reduction program whose positive incentive effects on the country's labor force to reside and 
contract jobs domestically only gradually ameliorates as the provision of basic social service 
recovers and opportunities to take formal sector employment improves the to country's poor that 
in the past migrated to assume informal employment as illegal labor abroad.  
 
With imperative in mind, that pubic proceeds from ownership reform and reform of government 
recurrent revenue base process as extremely slow pace - expenditure warranted by increasingly 
ambitious government reform surface as overly ambitious.  
 
Agricultural output reduced in 2003 – considerably affecting the lives of Moldova's large rural 
population and substantially clouded their prospects to sustain a reasonable future living from 
their farms. Recent land ownership reform coupled with a literal non-existence of logistical 
market structures including transport webs and the technical assistance warranted to ignite a new 
Moldavian agrarian economy – while eroding historical production incentives – hereto failed to 
install a productivity enhancingalternative to former cooperative farming industry.  
 
External viability nevertheless continued ameliorated as National Bank of Moldova's foreign 
currency holdings rose with a reasonable gradualism – eliminating foreign currency risks to the 
lei while posing minimal risks to inflationary pressure of reserve money origin.  
 
With the reasonable assumption that labor migration continued generate substantial outflows of 
skilled Moldavian labor during 2003 – as demonstrated by a record high level of remittance 
payments received from abroad – educational reform remains a principal issue. Moldova's 
government may accommodate requirement to improve recurrent budget balance by rescaling 
access requirement while providing new lines of specialization at higher level education. 
Evidence from economies of broadly similar nature such as the new Baltic republics suggests 
that substantive admission fees may resolve as a viable avenue for public revenue reform while 
providing better incentives for the direction of students into their choice of expertise.  
Moldova's educational base and the country's national training institutions nevertheless remain 
amongst the country's strongest assets and need maintained as prime pillars for future growth. 
While obvious trade-offs between labor drain and requirements to sustain high educational 
standards raise shorter term concerns that need immediate policy attention – a new enterprise 
environment that coaches the country's work force into higher productivity jobs provides the 
better alternative to 'quality inferior' educational reform.  
 
As demonstrated by last year's growth to industry output and business investment – slowing the 
pace of privatization may not in itself retard the pace of economic revitalization. While Moldova 
integrates deeper with her historical markets in Russia and new markets within the European 
Union – challenges and opportunity to Moldova's labor force raise new incentives for 
employment seekers to reside at home.  
 
Most urgent is a policy reform purporting new investment in Moldova's non-tradable assets base 
– with the motivation to enhance economic returns from improvements made to the country's 
human capital base. In this regard, the creation of an open business environment for productivity 
growth in a large agrarian sector and onward processing of its products warrants immediate 
attention. While new market re-orientation purports the creation of a supply response to recent 
ownership reforms –provision of new public service should over a slightly longer term 
substantially raise benefits from holding a job in this increasingly migrant economy.  
 
As the ripe fruit needs fertile growing conditions for new trees to be raised – East European labor 





Wheat Crisis Monitoring: 2004 Q1 
 
by Galina Selari 
 
 
The situation at the Moldovan wheat, flour and bread markets still remains to be quite difficult in 
2004 Q1. Despite the actions aimed to activize the wheat and flour import taken by the 
Parliament on the 25th of December, 2003 (Law #568-XV), their supply to Moldova's market 
was quite modest. According to the estimate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry 
there were imported 7.27 thou tons of wheat and 31.697 thou tons of flour in 2004 Q1 and 
Moldova will need another 115 thou tons to provide for its necessity in wheat till the new 
harvest, since only 131.27 thou tons (or 43.8%) out of the planned 300 thou tons were imported.  
 
The attempts to alleviate the impact of the bread price rise through production of cheap bread by 
Franzelutsa SA affected negatively its financial indicators and, as a result, Franzelutsa SA, 
supported by the Ministry of Agriculture, worked out a draft programme to prevent the 
enterprise’s bankruptcy envisaging: first, the state is to restore at least a part of the lost floating 
assets (9 mil MDL according to some estimates) and introduce a compensation mechanism of the 
poorest population strata from the state reserve and, second, the compensation from the state 
reserve at prices should provide for at least zero profitability of bread supplies to state 
institutions (hospitals, etc.) where up to 25% of cheap bread is delivered.  
The situation that has developed in the country’s bread supply (bread price rise first of all) and 
information gathered by the leaders of Franzelutsa SA was examined on February 28, 2004 at the 
session of Higher State Council for Security (HSCS). The Council decided to form a special 
parliamentary commission to assess the situation on the wheat and bread market. That same day 
the Government during its special session in pursuance of the HSCS’ decision dismissed A. 
Roibu, director of the Center for Fighting Economic Crimes and Corruption, G. Lungu, deputy 
director of the Agriculture Direction of the State Chancellery and reprimanded D. Todoroglo, 
Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry.  
 
As a result of the parliamentary commission’s investigation of the situation at the wheat and 
bread market several criminal cases were opened (including cases against former executive 
officers of Franzelutsa SA).  
 
Considering the fairly low import activity the Government formed at the beginning of March a 
working group within the Ministry of Agriculture led by the Minister of Agriculture and 
entrusted it with a task to provide the country with bread. It decided to buy 25 thou tons of food 
grain at the lowest possible price at the state budget expense. It was supposed that the delivery 
would be done during March. But this intention was not realized in short terms. 
 
The corresponding amendments were made to the Law on the State Budget for 2004. The money 
has to be reimbursed to the budget immediately after the wheat is sold at the internal market.  
 
It was only 18th of March, 2004, when the National Agency for State Purchases (NASP) carried 
out the first tender for purchase of 25 thou tons of food grain for the needs of the State Agency 
for Material Resources and Humanitarian Aid. Terms for companies – participants were as 
follows: payment upon arrival of wheat to the Ghindesti railway station, Floresti, gluten 
substance in wheat of the 2003 harvest no less than 25%, protein substance – 12.5%, humidity no 
more than 14.5%. Three companies applied to participate: “Product-Impex” SRL (25 thou tons 
of food grain from Canada at 148 USD per ton); “Trans Oil” LTD (12,5 thou tons of food grain 
from Kazakhstan at 222 USD per ton); “Кenja” SRL (25 thou tons of food grain from 
Kazakhstan at 175 USD per ton).  
 
On the grounds of failure to comply with the tender terms the NASP declined all proposals: 
“Product-Impex” SRL (laid down a condition that delivery has to be paid immediately after 
shipment from Canada); “Trans Oil” LTD (delivery of only 12.5 thou tons instead of the 
declared 25 thou tons); “Кenja” SRL (presented incomplete set of papers).  
 
The second tender was organized by the NASP on the 6th of April, 2004. There were four 
companies that participated: "Voest-Alpinie Intertraining" (25 thou tons of wheat at 233 USD 
per ton – delivery of goods to the Transnistrian border – and at 245 USD – delivery to the 
Ghindesti railway station, Floresti); "Trans Oil Ltd" (13 thou tons of food grain to the Ghindesti 
railway station at 2.72 thou MDL (226 USD) per ton); “Кenja” SRL (25 thou tons at 165 USD 
from Kazakhstan to the Ghindesti railway station), "Moldova Druc" (25 thou tons from Latin 
America or Canada at 164 USD per ton or 50 thou tons at 161 USD per ton to the port of Odessa, 
Ukraine). “Product-Impex” SRL renounced its participation in the second tender due to 
disagreement with the payment terms (delivery of wheat to the Ghindesti railway station). The 
results of the second tender organized by the NASP are still unknown (it was supposed that they 
would be announced in 15 days).  
 
In the meantime, entrepreneurs prefer importing flour. At the present, at the Moldovan universal 
commodity exchange wheat flour (in any amount and of any quality) is offered at 4.8-5.2 thou 
MDL (375-406 USD or 220-250 euro) per ton.  
 
It is not improbable that, if a company wins the tender for the wheat supply, the country will not 
get the wheat earlier than the second half of May, 2004. We should note that prices for wheat at 
the international market remain to be quite high (see the FAO forecast).  
 
Considering that both Moldova and the region as a whole are into a good crop of cereals and the 
supply deadline of the “state wheat” has not been set yet, it must not be ruled out that the wheat 
supplied under the state purchase could turn out to be excessively expensive and the situation of 
1997 will recur (see the Moldovan Wheat Market Research, FSP/CISR, 2003, p. 9).  
 
It is symptomatic that the Government prepared in March, 2004, a draft law stipulating for 
repudiation of grain-purchase enterprises’ debts to the Ministry of Finance resulting from the 
difference between the purchasing prices for wheat bought for external credits rendered within 
the PL-480 Programme and the prices at the internal market at the time of its receipt.  
 
Besides the state and market actions there is another channel of coming of foodstuffs to Moldova 
– humanitarian aid: 
 
 10 thou tons of food grain (Russia), 2003; 
 2.1 thou tons of food grain (China), 2003; 
 two US organizations, IFE&CN and FFP, will supply 8.9 thou tons of flour for macaroni 
production within the Food Humanitarian Aid Programme for 2004 proposed by the 
international organization IPND (USA); 
 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation started a project for urgent 
humanitarian aid in 200 Moldovan villages. 7 thou persons will get one-time cash 
compensations of 850 MDL within the project. It is realized in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.  
 
The crop forecast for 2004 in Moldova gives hope. According to the data of the Ministry of 
Agriculture there were 264 thou ha sown with winter wheat in autumn of 2003 (50 thou ha more 
than in 2002); preparation for the spring field work is done ahead of the schedule. Economic 
units have been supplied with seed materials; they are now being provided with fuel, including 
through Moldresurse IS. The total wheat harvest is expected at circa 3 mil tons. Another action 
followed: on 8th of April, the Parliament presented an initiative to the Government to 
supplement the cereals list (rye, oats and maize) exempted from customs fees during import and 
prolong the deadline the cereals exemption from the customs fees payment ends – from the 1st of 





FAO forecast for 2004/2005 marketing year for world wheat production is 596 million tons, 
6.6% more than in 2003. Compared with last year, output is expected to increase significantly in 
Europe and slightly in Asia, more than offsetting likely reductions in all other regions, the most 




 2003 (estimate) (mil. tons) 
2004 (forecast) 
(mil. tons) 
2004 cf 2003 
(%) 
Asia 244.9 251.6 2.8 
including: 
China 86.0 83.1 -3.4 
Kazakhstan 12.0 13.2 9.6 
Africa 21.5 20.1 -6.6 
Central America 2.9 2.0 -30.6 
South America 22.9 21.8 -4.8 
North America 87.1 81.5 -6.4 
including:    
Canada 23.6 23.5 -0.1 
United States 63.6 58.0 -8.8 
Europe 154.5 196.7 27.3 
including: 
EU  91.5 102.8 12.4 
Hungary 2.9 4.2 43.9 
Poland 7.9 9.0 13.3 
Romania 2.5 6.1 145.3 
Russian Fed. 34.0 43.4 27.6 
Ukraine 4.3 15.7 268.7 
Oceania 25.3 22.3 -11.9 
Australia 24.9 21.9 -12.1 
World 559.0 595.9 6.6 
Developing countries 266.3 267.5 0.4 
Developed countries 292.7 328.4 12.2 
 
In Europe, a strong recovery in wheat production is expected in the EU after drought sharply 
reduced output last year. Aggregate output of the EU is forecast at 102.8 million tons. Among the 
major producing member states, output is forecast to increase by 23 percent in France, and about 
11 percent in both Germany and the United Kingdom. By contrast, output may decrease slightly 
in Spain because of delayed planting reducing yield potential. 
Among the central and eastern European countries (CEECs), prospects for the winter cereal 
crops are also generally favourable. In the three major producing CEECs - Hungary, Poland and 
Romania – aggregate wheat output is forecast to increase by about 6 million tons, to over 19 
million tons, representing a 45 percent increase from last year’s poor crops. 
 
In the European CIS sub-region, the area planted with winter wheat rose from the previous 
year’s poor level to an estimated 14.5 million hectares. Based on the condition of the winter 
crops, which account for about 50 percent of the aggregate (winter and spring) output, and 
assuming normal conditions for the spring crops, the aggregate wheat output in the region is 
forecast to more than double from the reduced 2003 level to some 61 million tons but would 
remain below the bumper crops recorded in 2001 and 2002. The Russian Federation and 
Ukraine account for the bulk of the total. 
 
The FAO forecast for world trade in wheat (including wheat flour in grain equivalent) in the 
season ending 2003/04 (July/June) has been raised by 3 million tons since November to 99.5 
million tons. The revision mainly reflects higher forecasts for wheat imports by China, the EU, 
Romania, and Ukraine.  
 
Turning to exports, the fundamental picture is that of major exporters regaining their market 
share after two consecutive seasons of declining sales. All major wheat exporters, with exception 
of the EU, are likely to increase sharply their exports this season. Larger exports are expected 
from Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States.  
 
Nonetheless, the FAO forecast for trade in 2003/04 still points to a substantial decline of about 
6.2 million tons from 2002/03.  
 
World wheat stocks for crop years ending in 2004 are put at 139 million tons, down 48 million 
tons, or 25 percent, from the previous season. The biggest decline is expected once again in 
China. Significant draw-downs are also forecast for the Russian Federation and Ukraine as a 
result of exceptionally poor harvests in 2003.  
 
International wheat prices rose during the first half of the 2003/04 marketing season, supported 
by reductions in exportable supplies in the EU and in a number of CEECs and the CIS. The price 
of US wheat No. 2 HRW surged to US$180 per ton during the fourth week in March, raising the 
average price for the month to US$168 per ton, up US$18 per ton from October and US$22 per 
ton, or 15 percent, more than in the corresponding month last year. By late March, the CBOT US 
Wheat futures price for July 2004 delivery was quoted at US$153 per ton, up US$49 per ton, or 
47 percent, from the corresponding period last year. However, favourable planting conditions 
and forecasts for a rebound in world wheat production in 2004, coupled with generally weaker 
import demand prospects, are expected to restrain price increases in the coming months. 
 





As of April 2005, Republic of Moldova will get its 10th – since gaining independence in 1991 – 
government. Again, the prime-minister contender will have, under the Constitution, only 2 weeks 
to prepare programme of activity, functions, structure and personnel of his/her cabinet. As 
regards the programme, it is clear that it will be expounded in the framework of the Economic 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2004-2006 (EGPRS) and EU-Moldova Action Plan 
for 2005-2007 “canonized” by the Parliament. However, it will be harder to define functions 
and structure, since neither science, nor previous Government elaborated any prior 
intermediates.  
Therefore, it is very likely that – as was the case of previous cabinets – they will try to unite/part 
ministries and departments, as well as to reduce (once again!) number of state personnel. We 
have already seen it all, but the number of state personnel instead of reducing has unfortunately 
grown almost sevenfold since 1990. And the main question remains unanswered: is state 
administration system ready to modernize Republic of Moldova according to its European 
choice?  
 
Moldova is returning to Europe, trying to define its place there starting from interests of both the 
state and its citizens. Situated on southeastern outskirts of the European area, Moldova 
nonetheless does not want to be a marginal – a country of peripheral economy, culture and 
mentality. With this in view, Government and the current generation of Moldovan citizens have 
to work hard to revive the country and raise quality of governance, business and living up to the 
level of existing European standards.  
 
Transiting to reforms of the new type, according to initiatives of the President, V. Voronin, 
ensuring higher (than 5-6% according to SCERS) GDP growth rates and better consistency in 
transformation of the state, economy and society in accordance with EU-Moldova Action Plan 
presupposes further improvement of functions and structure of state machinery. This state 
machinery, despite partial changes of the last years and the process of adaptation of some of its 
bodies and officials to market conditions, still bears a strong imprint of past political and 
economic systems.  
 
Moldova has already lost too much time because of contradictory and ineffective reformation of 
the 90’s. Over this period, central European and Baltic countries managed to build legal and 
institutional foundation of their statehood, to make economic growth start and draw their 
competitiveness closer to the EU requirements. With a view to not waste any more time and 
chances for Moldova’s European integration, a system of well-coordinated actions concerning 
realization of EU-Moldova Action Plan is a number one national priority. It has to be the 
Government and state machinery that we should start reforming from, since their role in 
implementation of EU-Moldova Action Plan is principal.  
 
The current system is notable for excessive fragmentation of the central state machinery: there 
are more than 50 ministries, departments and state agencies. This process has particularly stirred 
up after 2001, when for each “issue” a special department or agency was formed to strengthen 
state impact. At that, though, there is no strong centre of the socio-economic policy planning and 
coordination. This can be Ministry of Economy that is gradually getting rid of the Gosplan 
atavisms: line-based approach is being replaced in the economy by the problem-based one. But 
limited potential of the Ministry’s key unit – Department of Macroeconomic Policy – does not 
allow it to occupy a dominant position in relations with NBM, Ministry of Finance and 
international financial organizations. Some ministries and departments have a pronounced 
tendency towards administrative interference into business activities.  
 
A new phenomenon appeared – business based on plenary powers, when ministries and 
departments transferred “on legal ground” a part of their functions to “affiliated bodies” for 
rendering of paid services to business and population.  
 
At the same time, as regards the Government’s functions and structure regional factor is 
evidently underestimated, including relations between the center and local public bodies, 
decentralization of resources and responsibility. As a result, business “crowds around the power” 
– more than 80% of economic units are registered in Chisinau, while other areas, small towns in 
particular, did not get over depression. Role of the Government’s Apparatus (State Chancellery – 
before 2005) and nature of its cooperation with the President’s Administration have not 
crystallized yet. Following this, there is direct evidence of inert, fragmented and many-storied 
structure of governance.  
 
Existing situation affects negatively the process of the country’s modernization. First, it hampers 
any attempts, including initiatives of the President, to liberalize, deregulate or demonopolize 
economy. Group interests penetrating through different channels often enjoy organizational and 
political support inside the Government and further – in Parliament. Under such conditions, a 
dynamic, well-coordinated policy of reforms so essential for realization of EU-Moldova Action 
Plan seems to be hardly realizable. It would be arguable to hope that Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in the person of the corresponding department will cope with all this work. In Ukraine, for 
instance, these functions are entrusted upon Ministry of Economy and European Integration, and 
upon Ministry of European Integration in Romania. But, on the whole, as experience of the 
countries – new EU members showed, responsibility is incumbent on all levels and components 
of the state administration system.  
 
Experience of those countries also shows that formation of a new Government is the best time 
for deep changes in functions and structure of the state machinery. In this case, this process 
infringes less on private interests of the Cabinet members. The first stage of reformation usually 
consists in reducing number of ministries and departments (no more than 20) and, after that, in 
rationalizing structure of the Government, apparatus of which would deal only with functions of 
expert and technical service to the Prime Minister and Government as a collective body.  
 
Within the changed structure, one of Vice Prime Ministers, on behalf of the Prime Minister, 
would be responsible for coordinating processes of European integration, while another – for 
coordinating socio-economic policy of the Government. It is Ministry of Economy where 
functions regarding realization of foreign trade policy, regional development and cross-border 
cooperation, as well as creation of favorable conditions for investments and entrepreneurship 
have to be strongly reinforced. It is necessary to reconsider functions of ministries of industry 
and agriculture. Their functions should be defined by new realities of the country.  
 
Once functions and structure of ministries and departments were “Europeanized”, their deep 
internal reorganization is necessary. Thereupon only, an opportunity will appear to not only 
reduce, but also optimize employment in state administration, save budget funds and direct a part 
of them to raise wages of state officials, especially in sub-divisions that are directly engaged in 
practical realization of EU-Moldova Action Plan.  
 
In aggregate, actions to reform state administration should ensure: 
 
 An evident targeting of the whole Government at realization of EU-Moldova Action 
Plan, including its constituent – Strategy of Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction 
(SCERS); 
 A distinct division of political positions in government (prime minister, ministers and 
their deputies, political counselors) from apolitical state service (all other positions); 
 Competitive bases and transparency of selection of candidates for state service, financial 
and ethical stimuli for employment, efficient system of raising qualification of state 
officials, observance of the ethical code of conduct, including anti-corruption, of both 
persons holding political positions and professional state officials; 
 Training of specialists for practical work in key areas of EU-Moldova interaction: 
knowledge of European law canons will let obtain through negotiations the most 
advantageous conditions for transitional period and so-called temporary derogations 
(refusal to employ obligations of a candidate country) that render time to adapt to norms 
and conditions binding in EU. And it is necessary to create an effective informational and 
personnel database to solve issues emerging during negotiations; 
 Rational use of resources of the technical aid from European Commission and other 
donors with the switch to principles of long-term programming and object/problem-based 
approach, concentration on priority sectors and maximization of “hard” aid meant not 
only for consultations and education, but for investments and infrastructure as well; 
 PR-actions both at international forums and in bilateral relations that would characterize 
Moldova’s readiness for European integration.  
 
It is clear that these actions cannot be realized in form of an “emergency campaign”. They 
require continuous, laborious work and not one, but several nearest governments. Chances to 
realize the reformatory scenario depend on political will, continuity and coordination of actions 





Case of Moldova: Mass Labor Migration as a Consequence of Inefficient Reforms 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
“International Migration Regimes and Economic Development” 
Workshop of the Expert Group on Development Issues  
at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Stockholm, May 13, 2004  
 
Prof. Lucas’ study[1], quite impressive in its depth and coverage of all aspects of international 
migration, prompts to evaluate the causes and development of this phenomenon in Moldova. 
Indeed, as Prof. Lucas mentions, in the 90’s Moldova has unexpectedly become the poorest 
European country; no less than 1/3 of its labor force emigrated and the “tsunami” of remittances 
reaching 15-17% of GDP now turned out to be the bolt from the blue for the Government. It was 
only 2003 when the Law on Migration was passed and the Department of Migration under the 
Government was established; a series of projects are implemented with the help of the European 
Commission, UNDP, ILO and donor-countries (statistics, SME development, human trafficking, 
etc.); sociological polls are conducted.  
 
At the same time, government policy concerning migration is still uncertain, which is indicated 
by the lack of any comments on this issue in the PRSP[2]. That is why Prof. Lucas’ analysis of 
the experience of other countries and regions as regards adaptation to the phenomenon of 
migration is very valuable from the methodological point of view for elaboration of policy 
recommendations for Moldova.  
 
In order to accomplish this, it is important to understand the causes of this deadlock, stable 
depression in the country’s economy and labor market situation, the nature of migration, impact 
of remittances on family, community and the country as a whole; does migration help reduce 
poverty in the country? And, finally, how can labor policy be adapted to the new realities of 
Moldova as an EU neighbor?  
 
Moldova as a migrant-sending country  
 
There can be named at least three causes that turned “the garden of the Soviet Union” (N. 
Khrushchev) into a nidus of instability and poverty: 
 
 weakness of the young state, protracted search for the national (uniting) idea and location 
in a so-called “grey zone” – zone of geopolitical uncertainty, which deprives the active 
part of the population, especially the youth, of clear perspectives for the future;  
 the frozen conflict in Transnistria;  
 contradictory and inconsistent reforms in the economy.  
 
Despite that since 2000 official statistics has been recording a GDP growth, the largest part of 
GDP comes from outside the real sector of the economy. The bad state of business environment, 
acute lack of investments, critical state of the country’s balance of payment, large external and 
internal state debt and unreformed state apparatus – all these affect in a negative way the quality 
of economic growth[3]. One can judge about the low efficiency of reforms by looking at the 
main macroeconomic indicators of the Republic of Moldova during the transition period (see the 
table). It can be asserted unambiguously that the burst of migration in Moldova’s case was 
caused by socio-economic factors, rather than being motivated politically or ethnically.  
 
 
Social and Economic Indicators 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Population- total, 




1671 1809 1682 1655 1617 1615 1474 
      as % of total 
population 45.7 49.5 46.1 45.5 44.5 44.6 40.8 
Employed population, 
thousand persons 1646 1642 1495 1515 1499 1505 1356 
      as % of 
economically                   
active population 
98.5 90.8 88.9 91.5 92.7 93.2 92.0 
ILO unemployment 
rate, % … 9.2 11.1 8.5 7.3 6.8 7.9 
Wage earners, thousand 
persons 1127 1033 849 714 672 690 677 
        % as of employed    
population 68.4 62.9 56.8 47.1 44.8 45.8 49.9 
Nominal wage (month 
average), USD 47.5 46.6 28.9 32.8 42.3 50.9 63.9 
Inflation rate (end of 
period), % 11.2 18.3 43.7 18.4 6.3 4.4 15.7 
Gini coefficient 
(coefficient of income 
concentration) 
0.436 0.443 0.436 0.419 0.428 0.421 0.397 
Remittances, USD 
million 113.0 121.0 109.8 159.0 223.0 268.0 347.0 
                 as % of GDP 5.9 7.1 9.4 12.3 15.1 16.5 17.7 
        
Real GDP year-on-year 
growth rate, % 1.6 -6.5 -3.4 2.1 6.1 7.2 6.3 
Nominal GDP, USD 
million 1929 1698 1171 1288 1481 1624 1958 
Exports of goods (fob), 
USD million 890 644 474 477 567 660 802 
Imports of goods (fob), 
USD million 1238 1032 611 770 880 1038 1356 
Foreign direct 
investment (net yearly 
flows), USD million 




4.62 5.37 10.52 12.43 12.87 13.57 13.94 
Source: National Bank of Moldova, Department of Statistics and Sociology, CISR 
Note: Data are presented without information from Transnistria 
Information on external sector (remittances, export, import, FDI) are presented according 





Drastic changes of the 90’s in Moldova’s labor market were reflected both by the reduction of 
employment (by one third), and by shrinkage of skilled labor force in industry, as well as 
degradation of the science servicing this sphere. Total employment in the national economy 
(excluding Transnistria) dropped from 1.68 mil persons in 1993 to 1.36 mil persons in 2003, or 
by 20%. But unemployment during all these years has been considerately low (6.8-11.1%, under 
the ILO methodology) since the most part of economically active population shifted to the 
informal economy, or migrated.  
 
The active phase of migration had began in Moldova in the mid-90’s at the same time as had the 
post-privatization reorganization of former state enterprises in industry and of large collective 
farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) in agriculture, which has led to the burst in hidden 
unemployment. One of its indicators is that the wage earners/employed ratio has changed 
impressively from 72.9% in 1996 to 49.9% in 2003[4], meaning that a half of those “employed 
in the national economy” are formally employed registered by the statistics, but are actually 
absent from enterprises.  
 
 
Migration, remittances and poverty  
 
Some 500 thou to one million of the 4.3 mil residents of Moldova (including Transnistria) are 
believed to be working abroad. Cyclic and seasonal migration prevails, which makes it difficult 
to evaluate the real scale of migration. Quarterly estimates of the Department of Statistics (labor 
force survey) show 280-300 thou migrants, while opinion polls unveil at least twice as much. 
The Moldovan diaspora abroad has not been consolidated yet.  
 
The panorama of Moldovan migration, according to the ILO/Soros Foundation-Moldova study 
(2003)[5], is quite colorful: 
 
 one or more members of every third family are working abroad;  
 69.9% of migrants are male and 30.1% - female;  
 30,8% of them are urban residents and 69.2% - rural;  
 80.0% are between 25 and 40 years of age;  
 only 1/3 of the total number had no stable work in the home country;  
 about 70.9% of migrants left Moldova legally and the largest share of illegal migrants 
(36-44%) heads for the Mediterranean countries;  
 the receiving states are: Russia – 54.7%, Ukraine – 2.8%, Italy – 18.0%, Greece, 
Portugal, Turkey – 3.9% to 4.4%, Israel – 2.8%, other – 9.8%;  
 employment of migrants abroad: constructions – 31.0%, agriculture, small production – 
13.5%, domestic services – 30.9%, trade – 10.8% and no less than 10.0% of women-
migrants are occupied in the sex industry;  
 average monthly wage of Moldovan migrants, USD: Russia – 425, Greece, Turkey – 598, 
Spain, Portugal – 897, Italy – 941, Israel – 1065, France, Germany and Benelux – 1209;  
 95.0% of migrants used to remit money to their families in Moldova.  
 
The consequences of the labor force export for Moldova itself are very contradictory. On the one 
hand, it’s a dangerous weakening of the country’s human resources potential (the outflow of 
more skilled and educated persons, the impact upon fertility and health). But the remittances, the 
mastering of new skills and attainments, formation of diasporas as future networks/channels for 
trade, capital and technology flows back to the home country, are positive facts, on the other.  
 
According to estimates of the National Bank of Moldova, formal transfers grew extremely 
rapidly: from 1-2 mil USD in 1995 to 109,8 mil USD in 1999 and about 360 mil USD in 2003. 
And no less than 30-40% of transfers are informal. Thus, the annual amount of remittances 
exceeds now the average annual export of Moldova in the last five years (about 600 mil USD) 
and it is equal to the total foreign direct investments over the whole transition period.  
 
It looks like the state was not ready to make use of this money. The lion’s share of them were 
used by households of migrants for immediate consumption and only 10-12% was used for 
“investments in family” – education for children, purchase of dwellings, land and starting 
businesses. There were created no structures or mechanisms to accumulate these funds with a 
view to invest. At the same time, it is quite obvious the impact of remittances on the demand 
expansion, on the consumption spending and on import expansion (which was 1.7 times as much 
as the export in 2003), on currency depreciation, and pressure on prices.  
 
However, remittances’ influence on the poverty reduction and inequality elimination is 
insignificant. And their economic benefits mainly go to the higher quintiles of the population. 
Thus, in 1997-2002 the 5th quintile has been steadily concentrating 48.4-49.0% of the total 
disposable income of households, while the lower, 1st quintile – only 3.9-4.6%. The 
improvement of the Gini coefficient was minor: 0.436 (1997) and 0.421 (2002). More than 40% 
of the population lives below the absolute poverty threshold[6].  
 
 
Policy remarks  
 
The future position of the Republic of Moldova as an EU neighbor will mainly depend on the 
economic policy it pursues today. Control and regulation of migration and concomitant processes 
is one of this policy’s components. It is important to consider experience of other countries. The 
actions presently undertaken in Moldova are focused in general at the legal and institutional 
shaping of the problem: implementing the Law on Migration and some related subordinate 
norms, expanding the functions of the Department of Migration under the Government, creating 
an informational system “Migrant”, modernizing border control and procedures, etc. It is planned 
to ratify the European convention on legal status and social protection of the working migrants, 
to conclude bilateral agreements with the major countries of destination for Moldovan migrants 
(Italy, Spain, Portugal, etc.). But it is also important to accomplish actions intensifying the 
positive effect of migration upon economic development: normalizing relations between the state 
and private business, stimulating economic units to create new workplaces and the population to 
save and invest. The “remittances - tsunami” effect is very short-term and it should be used as 
efficiently, as possible. And another important task is to adapt the migration regime to the new 
situation emerging after the Eastern EU enlargement that may actually have both positive and 
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Employment is the Key Issue 
 
by Galina Selari 
 
 
The economic growth, its quality, rate, parents and sustainability is one of the vexed question 
today. And it is widely discussed by politicians, economists and journalists. The issues of export-
import, migrants’ remittances and others are put on the discussion.  
 
However, the key question – employment has remained in the shadow.  
 
The problem of labour resources use remains very acute and that why it should be solved urgent.  
 
Economic transformations and changes in ownership structure resulted in changes in labour 
relations and employment sphere. During the first phase of economic reforms the response of 
Moldovan labour market to sharp decrease in industrial output appeared as average wage cut but 
not as release labour. So, as compared with 1990, in 1996 the GDP dropped by 63%, amount of 
wage - by 80%, but the number of employed population – by 20% only. At the same time the 
king-size shadow economy was created and the unconcealed shadow employment without any 
legal background or labour contract was in blossom.  
 
The fact that economic growth occurred in Moldova during the recent years came to 6-% on 
annual average has had no evident positive influence on labour market. It is a pity, but economic 
growth can’t eliminate all social deformations by itself and to belief that it can make this is no 
more than illusion. And such illusions should be disappeared.  
 
In fact, the sizable increase of production had not resulted in job growth but even more the 
number of employed persons slightly decreased and the number of unemployed went up.  
 
But for all that even an employed person could be considered as semi-employed: in 2003 the 
average monthly wage size was only 34% above the minimum subsistence or enough to cover 
nearly 70% of minimal consumer budget.  
 
Within certain limits this could be explained by underemployment: those who worked less than 
full time or are in unpaid vocation (about 5-6% of total employment) and those who work full 
time, but both the work and income is shared, i.e. ineffective use of labour force.  
 
The shadow employment still exists either. It simply adjusted to new realities: now we have legal 
labour contracts, but often they have a formal character and as before based on the principle – 
“as we will agree”.  
 
Such marginal forms of relations at the labour market have become rather stable. And, strictly 
speaking, there is no reason to believe that they will ever be eliminated in the foreseeable future.  
 
It appears that this is exactly the price our market has paid over the decade of not-so-consequent 
reforms.  
And here is another illusion: everything depends on investments; once funds are invested into 
economy, we will succeed in everything, the growth will become sustainable and the universal 
revival will begin, as well as all other kinds of grace.  
 
There is no doubt that we need investments – labour force follows the production capital flow. 
And Moldova has been a visual proof of this during all last years. Almost every third family has 
now its “representative” abroad. In 2003, circa 280 thou of our compatriots worked abroad 
earning their living (Household Budget Survey data). Naturally, a gradual mental re-evaluation 
takes place: “work to live” rather than “live to work”.  
 
And a question arises – whether our labour market is ready for the investments inflow? There is 
no simple answer, unfortunately. A phenomenon has formed: stable unemployment coexists with 
the labor force deficit. Say, there is an excess of managers and jurists, while metalworkers and 
turners are needed. It turns out that workers of specific professions, specific qualification, 
specific skills are needed, rather than just workers. And the current labour market often falls 
behind the real needs of the economy.  
 
The demographic forecasts are also distressing. It looks like 2003 was the last year of the 
population growth and the absolute number of persons able to work will decrease in the future. 
In 2010 labour resource growth will make up no more than 9 thou persons and in 2015 the 
negative growth is expected of 20 thou persons at least (the calculations are very approximate as 
the last population census was conducted in 1989). One could supplement this with the loss of 
workers from prolonged unemployment: a person loses qualification after about a year of 
involuntary idleness and unsuccessful search for work (now, the average period of 
unemployment in the country is 23 months). Moreover, there is an acute lack of persons who 
know to work in a workmanlike manner. The reason is obvious: neither employers, nor workers 
are ready for the full-fledged market relations.  
 
A conclusion arises: the labour market is not ready for investments. Moreover, it is – in a certain 
sense – a hindrance to activization of investment processes. And if the market is not ready for 
investments, it is possible that they will not happen or will not yield the expected result.  
 
What can and should the state do under such difficult conditions/ firstly, it should elaborate a 
complex programme of actions in the socio-labour sphere – a labour market concept and 
measures of its implementation, i.e. create an effective and civilized labour market in Moldova, 
which would operatively supply employers with the labour force of required qualification and 
workers – with the work and adequate wage.  
 
So, with solving employment problem we will achieve both most important our goals: 




A Look from the Outside: Moldova and Ukraine - Bilateral Relations 
 
by Dr. Oleksandr Sushko, Center for Peace, 
Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Director 
 
 
International Conference "Europe and the Transition  
Process in the Republic of Moldova ",  
July 2-3, 2004, Berlin, Germany 
 
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine are close neighbors and natural partners; both countries have 
similar internal problems and foreign policy priorities. However, bilateral relations are still far 
from stable and mature. Let me draw your attention to the actual spectrum of Kyiv-Chisinau 
agenda, which is to illustrate specific political and economic processes in that part of Europe.  
So, what is common for both countries?  
 
 Both Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova are so called Newly Independent States, 
which appeared after collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. They are new actors at European 
stage. 
 Both countries have met similar problems in the process of state/society building and 
maturing independence, namely: economic and society frustration in the 90s, weak 
capability of state institution, corruption, backwardness, weak justice and judiciary 
system, deficit of media freedom, lack of civil culture and the weakness of the 'third 
sector'. 
 Moldova as well as Ukraine belong to the group of the poorest countries in Europe, 
which essentially limits their capacity in all aspects of domestic and international policy. 
Both countries have survived from the decade of economic decline and has been growing 
fast recently (9.4% GDP growth in Ukraine, 6.3% in Moldova in 2003). However, they 
remain poor in comparison with their Western neighbors. 
 Republic of Moldova and Ukraine both have common strategic objective, which is the 
membership in the EU (unlike Belarus and Russia which have not expressed such an 
ambition). However their European aspirations remain mostly declarative, without strong 
pro-European commitments in domestic policy. Both countries created a number of 
governmental bodies responsible for European integration, but their efficiency looks 
doubtful. In return, the EU builds its policy on the basis of European Neighborhood 
Policy, which does not provide the prospect of membership (unlike the EU policy 
towards Western Balkans), general dissatisfaction by this fact is visible in Kyiv and 
Chisinau. Currently both countries are in the process of the Action Plan preparation in the 
framework of ENP. Moldova has already finalized talks, Ukraine is still going on. 
 Ukraine and Moldova have close economic and political ties with Russia, military 
presence of Russia remains sensitive factor, however both states try to avoid becoming 
satellites of Russia (unlike Belarus). 
 Both countries are sending labor migration ones. Millions of Ukrainians and Moldovans 
work together in the EU and throughout the world. Citizens of both countries suffer from 
human trafficking. According to 'La Strada' data, 7% of young ladies-victims of 
trafficking identified in the EU are Moldovans and 6% are Ukrainians.  
 Having a lot in common Moldova and Ukraine at the same time have important 
differences  
 The countries belong to different 'weight categories'. Moldova is a small state, in 
contrary, Ukraine is a 6th largest (by number of population) country of Europe, and it has 
an ambition to play a role of middle regional power. This difference makes bilateral 
relations asymmetric. 
 Ukraine successfully secured its internal stability and territorial integrity whereas 
Moldova still has a Transdniestria separatist quasi-state with its non-legitimate 
'government'. 
 Moldova is a neutral state according to the Constitution; Ukraine is seeking a 
membership in NATO, developing the special relations with the Alliance on the basis of 
Charter of Distinguished Partnership (1997) and Action Plan of 2002. Ukraine is a 
contributor of South-Eastem Europe security being invovlved in peace-building activity 
in Western Balkans since 1993. 
 Moldova is a member of Stablity Pact for Southern-Eastern Europe which provides a 
hope to join Stabilisation and Association Process offered to Balkan states by the EU. 
 Moldova is the only parliamentary democracy in CIS, whereas Ukraine is a presidential 
republic with stronger authoritarian trends of recent years with unclear prospects. 
However parliamentary model hasn't guaranteed mature democracy for Moldova yet. 
 Moldova has been more successful in the process of joining WTO. It is a member since 
May 2001. Ukraine is still continuing negotiations hoping to join in 2005.  
 
There are similiariries and differences mentioned above which determine the agenda of 
Moldova-Ukraine relations. In practice according to my observation existing level of bilateral 
cooperation does not correspond to the level needed by both sides to promote their common 
interests. There is a visible lack of trust between political elites, lack of coperative civil activtiy. 
The intensity of relations remains low in comparison, for instance, with Ukraine-Poland 
relations.  
 
For Ukraine Moldova is evidently an important partner. Ukraine is a participant of the 
Transdniestria peace process (together with OSCE and Russia) from the very beginning of 
international efforts to tackle this regional conflict which has become a 'frozen conflict' after the 
active phase of early 90s. The border with Moldova is the second largest border of Ukraine (after 
Ukraine-Russia border) - 1222 km.  
 
Despite it is a small economy, Moldova is a second largest trade partner of Ukraine among CIS 
states (after Russia). The amount of Ukraine-Moldova trade is comparable with Ukraine's trade 
with the Netherlands. In the general rating of foreign trade partners of Ukraine Moldova is in the 
end of top-ten.  
 
However for a long time border and trade issues have been producing tensions rather then 
friendly cooperation between Kyiv and Chisinau. The border deal was formally complete in June 
2001, when the parties simultaneously ratified the Treaty on the State Border and an additional 
protocol which provided an exchange of territories. In return of 7 kilometers of the road Odessa-
Reni (which is going through Moldova territory across Palanka village) Ukraine has provided 
Moldova with a small piece (appr. 400 metres) of Danube river bank near Dzurdzulesty village 
to built a river terminal there. This regulation still didn't get a consensus in Moldovan society. 
Government of Republic of Moldova has ignored strong opposition inside country. Some 
political leaders still treat the protocol as wrong and unfair and call for reconsidering. This 
border dispute determined a debate on the essence of bilateral relations. Complains appeared that 
Ukraine behaves as an 'elder brother' using the weakness of small poor neighbor.  
 
In January 2003 the parties started the process of border demarcation according to Border Treaty. 
Two obstacles actually slowing down this process, namely: lack of funds and Transdniestria 
issue. Almost a half of Ukraine-Moldova border is under control of Tiraspol separatist regime. 
This part of border is probably the most criminalized one in the East of Europe.  
 
Another tension appeared when Moldova have introduced new custom stamps in 2001, 
demanding all foreign partners not to recognize old ones any more. The reason was to limit 
illegal economic activity of Transdniestria and meet WTO criteria. Ukraine, however, decided 
not to stop trade with the old stamps arguing that by this policy Chisinau wants to block and kill 
economy of Transdniestria. About a year has been needed to dissolve this dispute. This tension 
gained international resonance; Ukraine's position got negative perception of the EU and WTO. 
 
The parties did not achieve a consensus on establishing of joint custom check-points on 
Ukrainian side along Transdniestria border. Again, Ukrainian government suggested not to 
isolate Transdniestria foreign trade before the general solution of the conflict would be 
achieved. 
 
The key problem of Ukraine's standpoint vis-a-vis Moldova is that there are some strong 
business-political groups which are interested in preservation of status-quo in Transdniestria to 
continue some gray and shadow businesses. They do not express their position transparently but 
try to press government and president of Ukraine to preserve direct contacts with Transdniestria 
regime leaders. Lobbyists of Transdniestria exploit the issue of Ukrainian minority in that region 
of Moldova to get some public legitimacy of this policy inside Ukraine. As a consequence, 
Ukraine's policy remains ambivalent, contradictory, which undermines trust between Kyiv and 
Chisinau without any real benefits for both.  
 
The position of Kyiv on the so-called Kozak's Memorandum on federalization of Moldova 
offered in November 2003 has been unclear as well. In the beginning official support of this plan 
has been expressed by the president. Later, after plan collapsed, MFA acknowledged that the 
plan needs further debates and elaboration.  
 
Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova lack bilateral cooperation in their relation vis-a-vis the 
EU. In my opinion, it would be a good common agenda, using the experience of Vyshegrad 
countries, which cooperated for the sake of European integration.  
 
Europeanization is the strongest ambition for both countries. Ukraine and Moldova are the only 
Western NIS to search for EU membership. Therefore, they can and should speak in common 
voice to push European capitals to more active Eastern policy. In particular there is a need of 
common approach to border policy, visa and migration issues, transport, infrastructure 
development, dealing with smuggling and human trafficking, rehabilitation of victims of 
international crime etc.  
 
Ukraine's policy towards Moldova reflects the desire of official Kyiv to play a role of regional 
leader in the East of Europe. This is an honorable ambition. However, in order to conduct such a 
policy efficiently, Kyiv needs to learn and follow European style of leadership with a strong 





Echo of the bread crisis 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
Many people still remember the troubles of the wheat and bread crisis of 2003: bad wheat 
harvest, protracted reaction of the Government, “bread mafia”, abrupt increase (39.8% a year) of 
prices for bread, emergency actions of the Parliament, Government and economic units to import 
wheat. One as well could think the situation is under the control now. The Higher Security 
Council of the Republic of Moldova under the President V. Voronin examined the facts of the 
matter twice (February 28 and April 27, 2004) and “demanded the Government to take measures 
that would allow no more bread crises, to call those responsible to account and establish a strict 
control over economic units activating in this field”[1].  
 
It should be mentioned though that the main indicator – prices for bread – stabilized in the first 
half of 2004 (% to the December of 2003)[2]:  
 
 January February March April May June 
First grade bread 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 95.0 94.9 
Second grade 
bread 
100.2 100.1 100.1 100.2 97.0 96.6 
 
And first of all this is beneficent for the poor (circa 40% of the population) that spend the major 
part of their incomes for food.  
 
 
Sudden news  
 
And all of a sudden, when nobody expected it, alarming information came from the “bread 
frontline” in July: 
 
• mayors of some settlements (Cricovo, Sanjera, Ciorescu) stated during a session of the 
Chisinau municipal council there are bread lines and deficiency of “cheap” bread whose 
main consumers are pensioners and poor families;  
• Franzelutsa SA controlled by the state, the monopolist (about 90%) in the bread 
production in the municipality, despite the Government recommendations halved (down 
to 20% instead of 35-40%) production of “cheap” bread since its losses during May alone 
made up 1,6 mil MDL;  
• The harvest has begun and the wheat producers (it is expected that the crop will be good 
of 700-800 thou tons) worry about its sale and price. While the Government promised 
that it “will announce terms of purchase of bread grain in the nearest future and intends to 
buy grain directly from producers for a price that would account for expenditures and 
revenues”[3]. The Ministry of Agriculture thinks that it will most likely be 1,8-2,0 MDL 
per kg of wheat;  
• In the meantime, the neighboring Romania that also expects a good crop set a 25% 
customs duty on wheat, citing the need to protect its internal market from cheap grain 
from Moldova, Ukraine and Russia[4].  
 
Actions of authorities  
 
The bread crisis of 2003 that has endangered the country’s food security, as it is well-known, has 
also seriously shaken the whole state machinery. Learning a lesson from the occurrence, the 
President, Parliament and Government took a series of urgent actions to regulate the situation in 
the bread and grain market. Among them were: 
 
• decisions of the country’s Higher Security Council to monitor the bread and grain market, 
take control of prices and importers to eliminate illegal schemes with participation of 
many intermediaries;  
• the Parliament prolonged the term of exemption of VAT and customs duties concerning 
the wheat (as well as of rye, barley and corn seeds) import till September 1, 2004;  
• the Government decreased prices for 10-12% on average since May 1, 2004, for bread 
produced by Franzelutsa SA (in November of 2003 the enterprise increased them by 
46%). At the same time, a programme to prevent bankruptcy of this enterprise was 
elaborated through compensations of its grain purchases from the state reserve and 
restoration of lost circulating assets;  
• the import was monitored; but instead of expected 115 thou tons of wheat there was 
imported in the first half of 2004 only 19,4 thou tons, but, on the other hand, a lot of flour 
– 46,2 thou tons; a tender was conducted (the winner is Moldova Druck SA) to deliver to 
Moldova 12,5 thou tons of wheat from Canada and Latin America at 164,0 USD per ton 
to Ilyichevsk (Odessa) port, plus another 20,0 USD for delivery to the Floresti grain 
elevator;  
• the Public prosecutor’s office brought 8 criminal actions concerning violations revealed 
at Franzelutsa SA, and there were annulled dubious contracts of this enterprise with 
intermediary companies.  
 
Are these actions enough? Do they guarantee that errors and abuses in the wheat and bread 
market, including those in which corrupted officials participate will not happen again?  
 
Transparency and competition are necessary  
 
As one can see, reaction of authorities to the wheat and bread crisis of 2003 showed mainly 
through administrative and organizational actions. But this is clearly not enough for transparency 
and competitiveness of the market environment.  
Moldova’s grain market tends to grow. Over the last years, more than 60% of sown areas have 
been under grain and in productive years export of wheat, barley and corn exceeds 1/3 of the 
total export of plant cultivation products. But there still has been formed no stable legal base of 
this market.  
 
We already have exotic – for many other countries – laws “On wine” and “On walnuts”, but no 
law on a more important thing - “On grain and grain market”. Meanwhile, it is this law that – 
under experience of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Romania and Hungary – has to be oriented at 
creation of legal, economic and institutional conditions for competitive production and formation 
of a grain market that would provide for the country’s internal needs of bread, seed and fodder 
grain, as well as its export. The main aspects of the law should include: participants in the grain 
market, state support of grain production and processing, formation and utilization of grain 
resources, control over quality of grain, grain storage, organization of grain purchases for the 
state reserve, formation of an intervention fund to stabilize prices, grain export-import 
operations. Strict execution of such law will raise transparency and restrain voluntarism.  
 
There are other actual problems that require solution. Will there be implemented a mechanism of 
state grain purchases from peasants on the security of their grain? Will standards of financial and 
informational service of the grain market be improved? How justified is preservation of the 
monopolist position of Franzelutsa SA in bread production? Why there were introduced no 
targeted compensations for bread for the poor instead of the populist, but unprofitable for the 
state, production of “cheap” bread for everyone?  
 
All these solutions belong to the market arsenal. And unless we accomplish them, a bitter 
statement will remain topical: “Bad harvest of grain is a misfortune, but the rich one is a burden 
as well”.  
 
[1] Нет – повторению хлебного кризиса. «Независимая Молдова», April 28, 2004 
[2] Source: Department of Statistics and Sociology 
[3] Government press release, July 6, 2004 
[4]
 
 Ministry of Agriculture of Romania, AP Flux, 8 июля, 2004 
Moldova - Transnistria: Rules for Business 
 
by Liliana Agarcova 
 
 
A meeting of businessmen from Moldova, Transnistria and Gagauzia (Cocieri/Dubasari) was 
scheduled for early July. There have already been several meetings of this kind. They are held 
actively, but rarely - politicians hamper. The last of these meetings-discussions was held in 
Chisinau in November of 2003 at the initiative of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Reforms 
(CISR), the Small Business Association (Chisinau) and the Centre of Economic Studies, the 
Union of Manufacturers, Agrarians and Entrepreneurs (Tiraspol).  
 
The motto was: "No word on politics, only on improving conditions for mutually advantageous 
collaboration". The parties agreed that by considering the interests of both business communities 
it would be easier to restore the integrity of the economic space, attract investors and large 
projects, jointly and proudly enter the external markets.  
 
Recommendations were expressed, as well as the desire to form a consulting council for the 
authorities. But the "Kozak Memorandum" incident interfered. And the plans to meet again were 
thwarted by the recurrent burst of politicians' emotions, this time regarding the right to privatize 
industrial enterprises in Transnistria.  
 
Fortunately, the life does not end here. And the search for common grounds to restore the 
integrity of the economic area of Moldova as a "common state" has to go on. More so, since the 
Republic of Moldova made several "steps forward" regarding registration, taxation, and 
protection of consumer rights.  
 
Thus, so far, the problem of registration of economic entities from Transnistria at the State 
Registration Chamber of the Republic of Moldova and issue of papers confirming the place of 
manufacturing goods and services in order to apply VAT were the most spiny ones. However, 
the registration allowed economic entities from eastern raions of RM not to apply VAT on 
delivered goods and services, but it did require passing a series of bureaucratic procedures within 
tax and customs bodies and at the Chamber of Licensing. On the one hand, the provision on the 
registration of economic entities from the eastern raions at the Registration Chamber of RM in 
the Law on Enforcement of Title III of the Tax Code "Value Added Tax" may be seen as 
political, but on the other hand they may be seen as a tax concession upon delivery of goods and 
services, compared to those economic entities that are not registered. It is also important that the 
registration of enterprises from Transnistria has automatically granted a benefit to economic 
entities from the right bank of the Dniester, since the services they have received were not 
considered as imported and, therefore, the recipients of the services in Moldova were not obliged 
to pay VAT for these services.  
 
More than a year passed since this novelty has been introduced (measures to carry out export-
import operations by economic entities from eastern raions - that is the title of the decision of the 
Government of RM). And if at first it triggered negative reactions among Transdnistrian 
administration and enterprises, now the situation is totally different. According to the President 
V. Voronin, more than 400 economic entities of Transnistria, including "Sheriff", have registered 
with the Registration Chamber of RM over the last weeks. What does this mean? One may 
assume that the decision to register was inspired by the economic benefits available. But it may 
also be related to the extension of the deadline for inclusion of Transdnistrian economic entities 
into the Moldovan State Register of Enterprises from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2005? Or do 
Transdnistrian enterprises just bide their time?  
 
Apparently, the issue of application of VAT on export-import operations of Transdnistrian 
enterprises has been settled, but it's not. Most likely, political considerations were decisive in 
deciding on the registration of economic entities from Transnistria, rather than economic ones. 
And Moldovan legislators, having disregarded the specifics of VAT taxation of services, 
automatically exempted Moldovan recipients of services from the left bank of the Dniester of 
VAT. After all VAT applied to imported services is paid by their recipients, with no right to 
offset paid VAT during the future delivery of goods and services. As a result of this decision, the 
state budget of Moldova had to "lose", while economic entities-recipients of services to gain.  
 
And now, after a year, the Government of Moldova examines the issue of taxation of services 
rendered by Transdnistrian enterprises and it may well happen that these services will be 
considered as imported and their recipients will be taxed.  
 
Since the business environment for the relations between economic entities of Transnistria and 
Moldova is still unregulated, discussions between businessmen might be of great help. And there 
are a lot of questions that require mutually acceptable solutions. Let us mention just the most 
important:  
 
• Government of RM defined the tax policy for 2004-2007, which stipulates the reduction 
of the tax burden for businessmen and measures to support domestic producers, boost 
investments and export, small business development. Now, the Law on State Budget for 
2005 is being drafted. It stipulates the reduction of income tax on business activity from 
20% to 18% and income tax on natural entities - from 10% to 9%, from 15% to 14% and 
from 22% to 20% correspondingly depending on amount of income and increase of the 
non-taxable minimum of 3900 MDL per year for physical persons;  
• In view of ensuring uniformed enforcement of the requirements of the Law on Procedure 
of Import to Moldova and Export from its Territory of Goods by Natural Entities, 
Customs Department of RM via its decision set a procedure allowing goods to be 
exported for commercial and production activities, if their value does not exceed 100 
thou Euro. Goods that require licensing to be exported and strategic goods of double 
purpose are prohibited for export;  
• Amendments to the Law on Customs Tariff reduce the term of reimbursement of customs 
duties on goods placed under customs procedure in the customs area from 30 to 10 days;  
• Changes were introduced in the procedure of assigning tax codes, submission of data in 
cases when tax payer changes address, as well as procedures of replacing tax code 
certificates when lost;  
• Amendments to the Law on Licensing of Certain Types of Activity provide for issuing a 
license for 1 year term for the activity related to gambling industry, 3 years term - for 
production of alcoholic beverages, 25 years term - for the activity related to production, 
delivery and transportation of electric power and distribution of natural gas;  
• In order to create conditions for the activity of non-governmental organizations that are to 
get technical and financial assistance, the Government of RM issued a decision on 
assigning tax codes to these organizations located in the eastern raions;  
• The Law on State Tax provides for a new type of duty to be levied for issuing licenses on 
the use of official or historical name of the state in a trade mark and/or service mark;  
• The Law on Protection of Consumers' Rights bans import and delivery to the market of 
goods and rendering services if exhaustive and correct information is not provided in 
Moldovan/ Romanian and Russian;  
• As part of Chamber of Commerce and Industry of RM expertise services on goods and 
contracts shall rendered to Transdnistrian enterprises.  
 
A lot of time was wasted until Moldova and Transnistria finally came to an understanding that a 
joint agreement is to be worked out on the federative "common state". However, the process of 
reaching common grounds is difficult. Administrations agree and disagree, while the population 
and economy suffer. As long as both parties are close to a consensus on establishing a "common 
economic area", politicians and officials, rather than hamper contacts between businessmen 
should make use of their practical experience and initiative. We have to come to an agreement 






Economic growth does not connote higher human development 
 
by Ana Sîrbu 
 
 
After a two-year pause, a fresh Human Development Report of Moldova was finally launched in 
the end of July. Its theme was Good Governance for Human Development. It has been 
determined that there is a strong direct correlation between the level of good governance and that 
of human development (HD) in a country. The topic elected has proved to be a very audacious 
one, as characterizing, analyzing and proposing potential measures for a country’s governance is 
not an easy task. 
 
HD is the fundamental goal of the humanity. It is the process of enriching the spectrum of human 
opportunities for the people all around the world. It permits and facilitates the accomplishment of 
beautiful, long, healthy lives. Although the human development index (HDI) does not provide us 
with an exact, irrefutable measure of the HD level of a certain country, it certainly gives us a 
good picture of where we stand among the other countries of the world in terms of income, 
health and education. Moldova is placed on the 113th position among 177 countries rated in the 
yearly Global Human Development Report, pertaining to the category of the Medium HD 
countries. Although Moldova was in the first half of the 90’s one of the most progressive post-
soviet republics in terms of reforms, it has not managed to even slightly maintain the position it 
had in 1990 when it was ranked on the 64th place according to its HDI. Since then, the human 
development level of Moldova fell drastically. Now, 14 years later, the republic’s position is 
almost twice lower among the countries of the international community.  
Our attention is caught by the fact that even after four years of steady economic growth: 2000-
2003, although our GDP continues to rise, the HD level of the country does not ascend.  
 
The HDI evaluates the general accomplishments in a country in terms of three basic aspects: 
longevity (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (adult literacy rate and combined enrolment 
ratio), and a decent standard of living (adjusted per capita income in Purchasing Power Parity—
PPP$). This year’s global report determined that, in 2002, Moldova was on the 113th place, with 
an HDI of 0.681 on a 0 to 1 scale.  
 
There are three groups of countries according to their HD level: high HD: HDI>0.8; medium 
HD: 0.5<HDI<0.8; low HD: HDI<0.5.  
 
Now, more than 60% of the world’s countries have a higher human development. Moldova is one 
of the Medium HD countries. But unfortunately, in the transition period, Moldova has had almost 
the lowest rhythm of economic growth (besides Tadjikistan) amongst all the ex-soviet republics 
Although the country’s GDP has grown by a total cumulative of 24.1% for the period 2000-
2003, when economic growth was finally renewed, its HD position is that same 113th position as 
it was in 1995, after the sudden transition shock, when the country just started implementing 
market reforms. Comparing the data used to determine the HDI in both 1995 and 2002, we can 
analyze the structural changes this index experienced. Considering the components of the HDI in 
both those years, we are able to see in which areas the Republic of Moldova became stronger and 
which ones we regressed in. We can observe that life expectancy at birth increased by one year 
(from 67.8 in 1995 to 68.8 years of age in 2002), despite the high level of poverty and the low 
level of accession to healthcare by the financially vulnerable segment of the population.  
 
In the education domain though, the situation worsened considerably. The adult literacy rate 
dropped by 8.9 points (98.9% in 1995 and 90.0 in 2002), and the combined first-, second-, and 
third-level gross enrolment ratio decreased by 5 points (from 67% in 1995 to 62% in 2002). Why 
is now almost 9% more of our population illiterate? A large number of people cannot afford 
education, not even first- and second- level education that is public and free. A large number of 
children are obliged to work within their households and later, instead of attending the 
University a lot of them chose to work, within the country or abroad. Although the total number 
of learning institutions in Moldova is now higher (1674 institutions in 1995 and 1778 in 2002), 
the total number of students pursuing their studies within these institutions has decreased: 766.5 
thou in 1995 and 738.1 thou in 2002. Besides this, our population is steadily decreasing (4.34 
mil. in 1995 and 4.23 mil. in 2003) and instead of the elderly people who had received an 
education, appears the new generation that is not too much aware of the importance of learning. 
A number of qualified workers, teachers, doctors, etc. leave the country and the schools remain 
without the employees it once had. Sending their remittances home, all these people contribute to 
a higher GDP of their country, but a higher GDP does not mean a higher human development 
level. 
 
In Moldova, the GDP per capita grew indeed between 1995 and 2002, a change confirmed by the 
increasing GDP index: from 0.23 in 1995 to 0.45 in 2005 and the increasing real GDP per capita 
(PPP$) rank minus HDI rank index: from 23 in 1995 to 36 in 2002. Since the remittances sent 
home continue to increase, these numbers will most probably augment as well. However, we 
remain on the 113th place. According to the Department of Statistics and Sociology, Moldova is 
among the countries with a low level of income ($543 for the year 2003). Thus, if not for the 
remittances sent home by the people employed abroad, it would be a paradox that, with such low 
incomes, consumption is so pervasive and accounts for more than 100% of the country’s GDP. 
The per capita income in Moldova also speaks about our current poverty situation: circa 40% of 
the population is below the poverty line. The income insufficiency and the income unequal 
distribution (the Gini coefficient was 0.421 in 2002) trigger a lower level of healthcare and a 
worse attitude toward education. Therefore, in order to reach a higher level of human 
development, the best has to be done in order to eradicate poverty.  
 
We still have a long way to go. In the high human development countries, the average life 
expectancy at birth is circa 10 years higher than that in Moldova. Education dropped in Moldova, 
and enrolment in education institutions decreased (this percentage being of only 62%, compared 
to the high 80’s and low 90’s percentile of the highly developed countries). Therefore a higher 
attention has to be given to both healthcare and education.  
 
Although we still are among the countries with medium Human Development, Moldova’s 
position on the HDI ladder has significantly dropped since 1990. Poor education and healthcare 
are fully recognized signs of poverty, thus the best has to be done in order to eradicate poverty. 
Also, not only Moldova degraded since 1990, but the other CIS countries proved to be capable of 
a much sharper and effective progress. The HDI offers us information not only to know how 
developed we are in comparison with the other countries of the world, but also enables us to 
deduce a number of conclusions regarding the development dynamics of Moldova relative to 
other countries and the fields in which a number of measures need to be taken in order to 
improve our level of HD. It shows us the countries that progressed, that could give us an 
example of reforms the implementation of which was proved to be effective. Economic growth 




by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund eventually seem to agree on the date 
(November) of discussion of “Moldovan triennial”or Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (2004-2006), which also took the government three years for its preparation. Most 
probably the Fund and Bank will approve this strategy and then our Parliament will put it into a 
legal document, the more so as the first year of this triennial comes to an end.  
 
Do we switch to reforms of a new type?  
 
Meanwhile, it was in parliament where a new initiative was stated: i.e. a transition to new type 
reforms. First this was said by the President V.Voronin at the close of summer session (on 
28.07.2004) and then supported by speaker E.Ostapciuc at the opening of an autumn parliament 
session on 23.09.2004: “We are to initiate reforms of new types that would facilitate a more 
sustainable development”. 
 
The essence and methods of realization of the reforms of a new type yet to be interpreted. Still, it 
is encouraging that the President has acknowledged that the reforms should continue since the 
very fact of “both social stabilization and economic growth does not mean anything in a poor 
country”. And this is true. GDP growth has resumed in Moldova since 2000 (its increase came to 
about 34% in 2000-2004) and this happened while the employment reduced (!) by 10%. Only 
about 40% of the growth was brought out by industry and agriculture; its growth was mainly 
caused by service sector, a rise in consumption and taxes levied on goods and import. Besides it 
was influenced by remittances transferred by our fellow citizens working abroad. It is clear that 
this pattern of growth guarantees the country neither sustainable development nor high rate of 
growth of GDP nor social rehabilitation of the population.  
 
From equality to inequality  
 
The assertion of Moldova being the poorest country of Europe became a stereotype. Here it 
should be added that such drastic social inequality between the new rich and the new poor has 
not evolved in any of the other 14 post socialistic countries of the Central-East Europe as it has 
happened in Moldova. After 1990 income inequality in terms of Gini coefficient applied by 
UNO has doubled and reached 40-44.  
 
Thus, in the mid of 2004 only 6.2% of total household income volume fell to the share of 20% 
less secured families and 44.2% - to the share of 20% the most well-to-do families. Recent years 
revival of the dynamics has reduced a poverty zone in Moldova but it has not removed contrasts 
of inequality.  
 
Nevertheless the majority of citizens of the RM still remember realia of a “developed socialism”, 
when the state secured relative equality of incomes that basically depended on a salary (except 
nomenclature’ privileges and “bla
Inequality began to increase rapidly during the transition period. At first it was caused by the fact 
that many people lost jobs and their money saving, and then - by process of privatization of 
enterprises, land and dwelling. Salaries paid in certain sectors became sharply different. 
Moreover, entrepreneurs have derived an income from shadow economy and employees of 
public offices – from corruption.  
 
In Moldova in 1997-2003 real salaries grew annually by 7.7% starting from the mid 90s and after 
1999 they have risen on average by 14.7% per year. On the other hand, at the same time the 
contrasts became even sharper. If in 1996 salaries in agriculture made up 2/3 of average salaries 
of national economy, then in 2003 they already came to ½. The same tendency took place in 
education and public health sectors. In 2003 salaries that exceeded an average level were paid in 
construction, transportation, industrial and financial sectors and public administration.  
 
It is strange, but remittances sent from abroad also spurred the inequality. As the most initiative 
and educated part of the population went abroad for earning, 70 % of remittances get to well-to-
do households. These remittances are spent mainly for consumption and also for “family 
investments” – for children education, purchase of apartments, land and investment into small 
business. Additionally, state social programmes do not facilitate much to elimination of 
inequality. Rendering of assistance in the programmes is based on a principle when citizens are 
assigned categories but it is not based on their real needs. 
 
As a result, according to the Ministry of economy estimates (2003) only 6.6% of social transfers 
(without pensions) fell to the share of 20% less secured families and 46.0% to the most well-to-
do families – recipients of such assistance.  
 
 
Images of inequality  
 
Inequality is many-sided. The tenseness of the situation also consists in that the inequality 
becomes apparent not only through contrasts in incomes or availability of property (which is an 
obvious sign for today), but through unequal conditions of access to the future – access to 
education and health care.  
 
According to the sociologists data (2003) the number of days spent by the poor and the well-to-
do in hospital are in the ratio of 1:11. The number of matriculated persons from the poor is tree 
times less than the number of matriculated persons from the well-to-do. Only every tenth is 
matriculated from the village youth that apply for admission to institutions of higher learning, 
while from the town-dwellers – every second. 
 
It should be mentioned that the inequality in job opportunities available in Chisinau municipality 
(small business, construction, service and security sectors) and persistent stagnation for the rest 
of the territory, except 3-5 other towns (Edinet, Balti, Ungheni and Cahul). 
 
Thus, many of the rights of citizens declared by our new democratic Constitution (1994) are 
difficult to realize. Thereby life of many people, especially young generation, is dominated by 
sense of vulnerability, impossibility to plan their future.  
 
What is to be done?  
 
One should not assert that the government does not see the inequality as a dangerous reason of 
social and political tension. Thus, in EG-PRSP for 2004-2006 “elimination of inequality and 
increase in participation of the poor in economic development” are mentioned as the priority. 
Basic approaches for this are well-known and approved in countries that undergo active reforms 
in transition:  
 
 To increase employment for those who want and are able to work, to stimulate opening of 
new jobs – especially in a sector of small and medium business;  
 To focus attention of the central government and administration of regions on the poorest 
localities; 
 To make social assistance targeted for those who really need the state support. 
 
At present the draft budget for 2005 is considered in Parliament. Again, the Government 
mentions that the state budget is “real and socially oriented”. But to whom is it directed toward? 
Confucius said: “ in a well-governed state they are ashamed of poverty, in a poorly ruled state 
they are afraid of wealth”. Inequality is a real danger for a young, weak state. Or we are neither 





Privatization in Transnistria: Risks and Profits 
 
by Vissarion Ceşuev 
 
 
Transition to privatization of the industrial potential in Transnistria, in our opinion, means easing 
of one more fundamental factor of tension of relations between the Republic of Moldova and the 
region. Along with the “politically-linguistic reason” of the region separation from Moldova in 
1990 there were and economic reasons, i.e. unwillingness of the working population to follow 
the path of formation of market economy based on private property and denial of privatization. 
That was reflected in the first self-name of the region – the Transnistrian Moldovan Soviet 
Socialist Republic.  
 
Now when fifteen years passed only one reason out of all others actually exists and is 
acknowledged by the both parties – ownership. All other circumstances - ethnic, political, and 
linguistic, have faded into the background.  
 
The denial of privatization in Transnistria lasted for a short time. A year of independence was 
enough to recognize the necessity of private ownership institutionalization and in December 
1991 Transnistria’s Law on Privatization was adopted. It stipulated for the following: 
 
 preferential right of labor collectives to choose the form and procedure of privatization; 
 combination of refundable and non-refundable ways of transfer of property rights; 
 equality of the rights of citizens to obtain a share of property subject to refundable and 
non-refundable privatization; 
 openness and public control over privatization.  
 
This concept envisaged non-refundable transfer of 51% of a privatized company to the members 
of the labor collective, possibility of leasing the company by the labor collective with the right to 
redeem the property of the company by the labor collective. The privatization principles used in 
industry fully applied to the property of collective farms, consumer cooperatives and interfarm 
associations.  
 
It was announced that a more detailed description of the privatization procedures would be 
formulated in the Privatization Program, which, however, was not published during the 
following five years. Moreover, in 1997 the Supreme Soviet of the TMR stopped privatization by 
a special decree. Meanwhile, in practice transfer of the right to use and manage a number of 
companies to private individuals continued on the bases of some orders and special decisions.  
 
By 2002 in Transnistria appeared a new conceptual base for a radical transformation of 
ownership and this process was promoted in 2002-2004. The philosophy of the new privatization 
concept completely differs from a so-called law of 1991. First of all it refers to the right of 
ownership of the population of Transnistria. The right to obtain a nonrefundable share of 
property by every citizen or member of a labor collective during privatization is stipulated 
neither in the amount of 51% of the statutory capital nor in any other form. The provision on 
principles of privatization of collective farms, consumer cooperatives and interfarm associations 
was also extracted. The main principle became the market one: if you have money you are the 
owner. The reason is the necessity to replenish the TMR budget and the Development Fund.  
 
In accordance with the new Law on Privatization the property right appears only as a result of a 
contest or auction, i.e. in the presence of not less than two candidates. However, in 2002-2004 
there were not uncommon cases when property rights transferred in the presence of only one 
candidate. That is why there is always a possibility to cancel property rights that appeared in 
such circumstances. These conditions are so obvious that it is most unlikely that the organizers of 
privatization, individuals arrogating the right to give property to other individuals, are not aware 
of them. It is necessary to understand the logic of behavior of organizers of such privatization 
and its participants as well. We are speaking of the risks assessment.  
 
Everything can be explained by the mentality of minions. All the involved parties understand 
that sooner or later the defined property rights may vanish into thin air that is why it is difficult 
to provide a long-term future of a privatized company (a joint stock company). All attempts to 
replenish the working capital of such a company by placing shares in the secondary market will 
be hopeless. It is rather doubtful that there is a bank, which accepts illegal property as a long-
term pledge.  
 
It is obvious that neglecting interests of both labor collectives and administration of the 
privatized companies will also have painful effects. The possibility of strikes, serious conflicts 
between the staff at all times considering their companies as “a second home” (at the emotional 
and psychological levels) and new owners is very high. There are such examples already: 
Tighina company (Benderi), Metallolitography company (Tiraspol), and others.  
The economic base of the rights of the labor collectives to obtain a share of property of their 
companies constitutes the fact that for many years the staff of the companies received as salaries 
not more than 10% of surplus product. It is a well-known fact of the planned economy era. That 
is why even if a Transnistrian company will be announced a branch of a foreign company having 
all legal requisites in its country, for example in Russia, overcoming the resistance of the 
working collective will require emergency methods. It is risky and ungrateful.  
 
If proceed from the fact that the new owners have understood the real situation, the most logical 
conclusion could be that industrial privatization in Transnistria is carried out with one short-term 
objective: to take a risk and to receive capital both from production and sale of stock of 
equipment, raw materials and other parts of fixed assets.  
 
The issue on property in land is not solved either. The regional referendum on this issue held in 
2003 gave a negative result. It was a result of a longstanding social aim of the population at the 
inevitability of misfortune which property in land brings. Meanwhile, agriculture in the region is 
already a disaster as a result of a complete bankruptcy of the kolkhoz-system, which, as it is 
known, cannot operate effectively without non-economic compulsion to work and financial 
benefits.  
 
The way out was found in rather exotic actions: in autumn 2004 in accordance with the decree of 
the president of the TMR collective farm Parcani in Slobodzia was abolished as a legal entity. Its 
land (more than 6,500 hectares), buildings, facilities, other asserts were let to lease to one of 
Transnistrian businessmen for 99 years, i.e. nearly forever. It was nothing else but assignment of 
a landlord and proclaiming hundreds of villagers, former collective farmers, landless on their 
own land. In history of Moldova this fact probably has no precedent. Neither the tsarist 
government in the end of 19th century, no Romanian government in 1920-1921, when carrying 
out the land reform in our region, dared to leave those who worked on the land without it, i.e. 
without any hope.  
 
It appears from this that impetuous actions on privatization in Transnistria are unconvincing so 
far and outside the region they are not perceived as legitimate enough. What is the solution of the 
problem? As yet there are two approaches.  
 
The first one: not to recognize any results of privatization and to press for an unconditional return 
of the economic potential of Transnistria to the legal field of the Republic of Moldova. With the 
help of the international society to establish control over all the territory and carry out re-
privatization in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Moldova. This process for sure 
will be accompanied by opposition of new owners of Transnistrian companies including sale of 
asserts of privatized companies that looks like scorched earth tactics. This risk, this option of 
developments, cannot be excluded.  
 
The second one: to follow the principles of “Dmitrii Kozak’s Memorandum” where, among 
others, there was included a paragraph on recognition of property rights that appeared during the 
period of the PMR existence. In this instance, the population of the right-bank will not be able to 
realize their property right in the territory of the left-bank. Meanwhile, as is well known, whole 
Moldova participated in building up the left-bank area potential. Besides, in1993-1995 about 150 
thousand residents of Transnistria participated in privatization of the right-bank territory 
potential. At present many of them collect dividends from their shares that were bought for 
national patrimony bonds. Thus, in the press of the RM in September-October 2004 “Agrofond” 
and “Dividend” placed regular advertisements for dividend payment with the address particulars 
at which the residents of the left-bank could collect their dividends.  
 
If to adhere to the principle of “everything which is on our land is ours” then one might get to a 
point when rights of joint property with foreign companies ought to be annihilated. All these 
issues are not simple and require a cautious solution taking into account interests of the parties 
on the reciprocal basis.  
 
Therefore, we believe that the third approach to be more productive: to regulate property 
relationships and legalize the enterprises privatized in Transnistria by a special scenario that 
takes into account both Transnistria realia and the outlines of a recently adopted law of the RM 
on left-bank enterprises privatization (October 2004). This scenario may include to following 
steps: 
 
1. to inventory and appraise the assets value by internationally recognized methods on the 
basis of experience gained e.g. by the Association of Appraisers of CIS countries; 
2. to document the real investment made into the enterprise of the Investor that gained 
entrance to it in the course of Transnistrian privatization; 
3. to coordinate the size of property distributed among working collective members and 
the state property share assigned on certain conditions to the state with its further 
distribution among other citizens; 
4. to secure registration of the securities of privatized enterprises (stock and shares) in the 
National Committee on Securities of the Republic of Moldova and their admission to 
the stock exchange of Moldova and as a pledge assets in the banking area; 
5. to hold joint stock companies stockholders’ meetings, to pass the foundation documents 
in accordance with the current legislation.  
 
In other words, it is proposed not to consider those who invested their funds into the left-bank 
potential to be the opponents. They should not be personally blamed for the current legal 
confusion in such a delicate issue. Yet they spent their funds i.e. they expended their undeniable 
private property. This should be taken into account quite benevolently. This is the advantage of 
privatization in Transnistria to all the inhabitants of Moldova.  
 
A well-weighed approach based on a respect of private property will make it possible to solicit 
the international financial organizations for opening a special credit line for a revival of 
economic potential of Transnistria. And if new owners of the privatized enterprises in the region 
take into account the conditions stipulated by the government of the RM, the latter could step 
forward as a guarantee of such loans. Then, the confrontation could eventually be over and it 
would be possible to proceed together to reconstruction of the economy of the “common state”. 
 
International seminar 
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The New Neighborhood: Moldova – European Union 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
Enlargement of the EU, its replenishment with another 10 countries in 2004 – from the Baltic 
states in the North to Cyprus and Malta in the Mediterranean – created new challenges both for 
EU itself (EU-25 now) and its new neighbors. EU voiced its vision of the situation through the 
concept of “Wider Europe – Neighborhood”[1], which doesn’t exclude further enlargement of 
the EU, but gives priority to “its internal consolidation and encirclement with well-managed 
countries”. The new neighbors include 14 countries, most of which are in the Balkans and 
Mediterranean and four in the East – Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia. But only two of 
them – Ukraine and Moldova – aspire to join the EU.  
 
Moldova’s European Choice  
 
The first decade since gaining independence – the 90’s – Republic of Moldova devoted to 
formation of its statehood, transition to democracy and market economy, macroeconomic 
stabilization and overcoming separatist tendencies (Transnistria, Gagauzia), which first of all 
required establishing constructive relations with the UN and international financial 
organizations, as well as with Russia that dominated post-Soviet area.  
 
At the same time, due to position at the junction of the Central Europe, the Balkans and the CIS 
and being a country with predominance of Latin ethnos, common historical and cultural roots 
with the countries of South-Eastern Europe, with Romania in particular, the Republic of 
Moldova, like the Baltic countries, was more predisposed to “return” to Europe than other post-
soviet republics. And the first steps along this path were: 
 
 Moldova’s ascension – first among the CIS countries – to the Council of Europe (1995); 
 Coming into effect of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Union and the Republic of Moldova (1998); 
 Moldova’s ascension to the World Trade Organization (2001); 
 Moldova’s joining to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (2001); 
 Development of the Concept of the European Integration of the Republic of Moldova 
(2003); 
 Approval of the Action Plan EU-Moldova by the European Commission and the 
Moldovan Government (2004-2005).  
 
As we can see, Moldova’s progress towards Europe was not as dynamic and productive as that of 
other Central European countries. All those years EU was also sizing Moldova up without giving 
it hopes but not rejecting it, either. In fact, during that period the Republic of Moldova – 
balancing between EU and the CIS – was in a zone of geopolitical instability, following the 
principle “we should be everywhere where it is advantageous to us”. This position could be 
explained mainly by economic arguments i.e., the CIS, especially Russia, is the main Moldova’s 
export market, on which Moldova completely relies for energy imports. On top of that, it is 
Russia’s companies (energy, engineering and winemaking) that are major investors in Moldova, 
including Transnistria.  
 
Finally, in 2003 Moldova’s leadership took a more explicit position on rapprochement with EU: 
“Republic of Moldova declared the path of European integration as the main national strategy of 
the state. We are aware how difficult and important this path is, but at the same time we 
announce that it is an internal political and economical choice of Moldova first of all”[2].  
 
Advantages of Moldova’s rapprochement with EU lie in the political, economical and social 
areas. Politically it means stability of democracy, rise of the state and citizens security. 
Economically it means the elimination of “peripheral economy syndrome”, increase of country’s 
competitiveness and prospect of a stake in the EU’s Common Market, expanding access to the 
development funds, investments and new technologies. Social aspect means harmonization with 
European standards in education, healthcare and environmental issues, access to information and 
protection of human rights. And finally, the constructive settlement of Transnistria problem, the 
only ‘frozen conflict’ at the Eastern land border of the EU, is of considerable importance both for 
Moldova and the EU.  
 
Transformation of the Economy as a Driving Force  
 
Position of the Republic of Moldova as an EU’s neighbor will mainly depend on what social and 
economic bases will be created through the economic policy conducted in the country. The fact 
that over the transition period Moldova endured the deepest economic recess among the post-
Soviet countries (2/3 of GDP), is currently a divided country (about 30% of its industrial 
potential is in Transnistria) and, unexpectedly for its population, has become the poorest 
European country makes this task more difficult.  
 
The transformation process of Moldova’s economy can be divided into two periods: radical and 
gradualist. The first of them (1991-2000) prioritized liberalization of the economy, while the 
second one (beginning with 2001) is marked by strengthening of the state’s role in stimulation of 
the economic growth. Having overcome crisis and depression, the country’s economy passed the 
“point of no return” in 2000 and started demonstrating a moderate economic growth over the last 
five years (6-7% a year), which is comparable to the average GDP growth indicator over CIS, 
but smaller than in the neighboring Romania and Ukraine (2004).  
 
Now, there are enough signs that Moldova’s economy has mainly adapted to the market 
conditions: major part of GDP (more than 70%), industrial and agricultural output, constructions, 
as well as services (including transport and telecommunications) are being provided by private 
sector; unemployment rate (under the ILO methodology) became steady at 6-7%; household 
incomes and consumption grow. Share of the population with incomes less than 2.15 USD per 
day decreased by 1/3 (about 40% in 2004). It is important, that these changes have also had 
positive influence on dynamics of the Human Development Index used by the UN. So, if in 1990 
the HDI for Moldova was 0.736 and it worsened down to 0.673 in 2000 there was registered an 
increase in HDI to 0.700 during the last years. The positive dynamics for Gini coefficient and 
social inequality decrease is outlined too.  
At the same time, the range of problems requiring solution became more manifest: improving 
quality of economic growth, provision of comfortable environment for entrepreneurship and 
investments, elimination of mass labor migration, pro-poor targeting of social assistance, raising 
the quality of governance and counteracting the “takeover” of the state by business groups 
feeding corruption in the administrative system. These unsolved problems and slow course of 
structural reforms restrains modernization of the economy and promotion of its competitiveness 
and achievement of sustainable socio-economic development.  
 
Realities of 2004  
 
On the whole, 2004 was successful for Moldova’s economy, if judging by such indicators as: 
 
 GDP growth of 7.3%, and 33.2% - or 1/3 – over 2000-2004, which is quite a lot; 
 Incomes of the consolidated budget increased by 13.6%, which (along with the borrowing 
from the NBM’s reserves) allowed to decrease the Government's external debt by 12.1% 
and raise wages of those employed in the budget-supplied sphere and pensions; 
 A more balanced dynamics of money aggregates. Amount of bank credits increased by 
22%. At that, the resource base of the banking system in form of drawn deposits grew by 
39%; 
 Investments growth rate into fixed capital tended to forestall GDP growth. The main 
sources of investments are funds of economic units and the population (65%) and foreign 
investments (20%). 74% of investments were used at production units; 
 Export exceeded $900 mil, which is more than in any of the previous years of the 
transition period. Pro-EU orientation of the export has strengthened: 1995 – 12%, 1999 – 
21%, 2003 – 26.6% and 2004 – 30.0%. Besides, 10.8% of export fall at the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe; 
 Monetary reserves of the NBM were raised 1,6 times (up to $470,3 mil); 
 Real monthly wage grew by 10.2%; 
 Recovery of the demographic situation in the country begins to show (birth rate increase, 
death rate decrease). 
 
The majority of these tendencies were of the positive orientation over the whole last five years. 
And it favored the growth of social optimism. At the same time, there is a changeable balance of 
positive and negative circumstances in the Moldovan economy (see Graph 1), which has showed 
through the realities of 2004 well: 
 
 The economy has rebounded mostly due to agriculture, favorable external market 
situation and domestic consumption growth, fuelled by the “tsunami” of workers’ 
remittances and sizable increases in wage; 
 The major part of the GDP growth in 2004 was provided by agriculture and food industry 
– sectors of unstable development. Food products made up 60.8% of export, including 
alcohol – 28.3%, which is more than the share of machinery and light industry products 
(26.1%); 
 Creation of new workplaces does not neutralize the tendency for employment decrease 
(7.1% over 2000-2004). Export of labor force is no less than 300 thou persons, or 20% of 
the economically active population; 
 Chronic lack of investments hampers reconstruction of the industrial potential and 
infrastructure (energy sector, roads and transport, water supply, etc.); 
 Trade balance deficit reached dangerous proportions: in 2004, import was 1,8 times 
larger than export – the country helps other countries’ producers; 
 Inflation rate of 12.4% (average annual) was the highest since 2000, which has fairly 
weakened efficiency of the social policy. 
 
Problem of the quality and sustainability of economic growth became the central topic of 
political discussions in 2004. The President has also contributed to this by setting a task for the 
Parliament and the Government to “proceed to reforms of the new type”. In harmony with this, 
“sustainable and socially-oriented development” has been established as the main reference point 
of the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2004-2006). It was acknowledged that 
“the quality of economic growth in Moldova is affected by unbalanced structure of the economy, 
by mono-structural export, and by low investment in fixed capital. Such a growth paradigm does 
not provide a basis for the sustainable growth needed to reduce poverty… To change the 
paradigm and quality will require mobilization of new resources and factors of growth…[3]”  
 
EU – Moldova Action Plan  
 
Republic of Moldova has become the first country, with the Government of which the European 
Commission coordinated the Action Plan (February 2005), thereby suggesting Moldova to 
demonstrate specific progress in Europeanization of the country, in mobilization of new sources 
and factors of growth within 5 principle components of the plan: 
 
 Political dialogue (democracy and the rule of law, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, sustained efforts towards settlement of Transnistria conflict); 
 Economic and social reforms and development (improve welfare, functioning market 
economy, trade-related issues, movement of persons and coordination of social security); 
 Justice and home affairs (efficient implementation of legislation, border management, 
fight against organized crime, drugs, money laundering); 
 Transport, energy, telecommunication and environment (implementing selected policies, 
measures and reforms); 
 People-to-people contacts (research and development programmes, education, culture 
issues, civil society cooperation, cross-border and regional level cooperation). 
 The key element of the EU-Moldova Action Plan is the economic component. What is 
important, the term of its implementation coincides with the medium-term Economic 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, which the Government of the Republic of 
Moldova agreed with the IMF, World Bank and donor organizations. This increases even 
more the responsibility of the Government, which has outlined the following progress 
steps for itself[4]: 
 Implement the EU-Moldova Action Plan in 2005-2007 and create conditions for 
Association Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Moldova; 
 Achieve the first Copenhagen criterion (democratic state system) by the end of 2009, and 
the second (competitive market economy) – by the end of 2012; 
 Complete negotiations of the Moldova’s adherence to the European Union by 2015. 
 
Having accepted a decade as a term for approaching the EU, Moldova’s Government sees the 
following obstacles on this path: imperfect national legislation as compared with the 
communitarian legislation, absence of appropriate institutions and personnel, slow advancement 
of the second wave of reforms, and unsettled Transnistrian conflict, as well as “uncertain 
position of the EU as concerns Moldova’s status as an adherence candidate”. And it is true. 
Moldova’s European choice has to have a historical perspective.  
 
The concept of the “Wider Europe – New Neighborhood” and the EU-RM Action Plan make 
relations between Moldova and the EU become better-defined. Moldova is to demonstrate that 
it’s capable of cooperating with the EU and can perform concrete progress in governance and 
reforms. And Moldova needs support along this way. If the Action Plan for 2005-2007 is 
implemented successfully the country may benefit from the prospects of closer economic 
integration, including movement of capital and technology, preferential trade relations, 
legitimate migration, etc. But a key question is that of finality. Moldova needs hope as a source 
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